In my Philosophy of Religion class I recently presented, as an example of logical argumentation, David Chalmers's "zombie argument" against physicalism. I'm going to try th argument again with my students tomorrow night, this time giving them the handout below.
THE ARGUMENT:
P1. If physicalism is true, then it is logically impossible for p-zombies to exist.
P2. It is logically possible for zombies to exist.
C. Therefore, physicalism is false.
If it is logically possible for zombies to exist, then consciousness cannot be explained reductively.
1. A philosophical zombie or p-zombie is a hypothetical being that is indistinguishable from a normal human being except that it lacks conscious experience, qualia, sentience, or sapience. When a zombie is poked with a sharp object, for example, it does not feel any pain. It behaves exactly as if it does feel pain (it may say "ouch" and recoil from the stimulus), but it does not actually have the experience of pain as a person normally does. (See “Philosophical Zombie,” in wikipedia - http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophical_zombie)
2. According to physicalism, physical facts determine all other facts. This means, on physicalism, that there are no non-physical facts. Therefore, since all the facts about a p-zombie are fixed by the physical facts, and these facts are the same for the p-zombie and for the normal conscious human from which it cannot be physically distinguished, physicalism must hold that p-zombies are not possible. Therefore, zombie arguments support lines of reasoning that aim to show that zombies are possible.
3. NOTE: The zombie argument against physicalism is, therefore, a version of a general modal argument against physicalism, such as that of Saul Kripke's in "Naming and Necessity" (1972).The notion of a p-zombie, as used to argue against physicalism, was notably advanced in the 1970s by Thomas Nagel (1970; 1974) and Robert Kirk (1974).
4. See the “zombie argument against physicalism” developed in detail by David Chalmers in The Conscious Mind (1996). According to Chalmers, one can coherently conceive of an entire zombie world: a world physically indiscernible from our world, but entirely lacking conscious experience. In such a world, the counterpart of every being that is conscious in our world would be a p-zombie.
The claim of Chalmers and others is a strictly logical claim. Which means: Since such a world is logically conceivable, Chalmers claims, it is possible; and if such a world is possible, then physicalism is false. (Note: “square circle,” or “married bachelor,” are examples of concepts that are logically inconceivable.)Chalmers is arguing only for logical possibility, and he maintains that this is all that his argument requires. He states: "Zombies are probably not naturally possible: they probably cannot exist in our world, with its laws of nature."It’s easy to imagine a “zombie.” A “zombie” is a creature physically identical to a human, functioning in all the right ways, having conversations, playing chess, but simply lacking all conscious experience.
So if a person can be physically identical to us yet without consciousness, then it would seem that consciousness is not a physical thing.“There is an explanatory gap here that is really something of an abyss,” says Chalmers.
Wednesday, March 31, 2010
Tuesday, March 30, 2010
Is Atheism Intrinsically Evil?
(Jember Teffera)
I have friends who were persecuted under atheistic regimes.
The first is Juan. That's not his real name, since he still is a pastor in Cuba. I met Juan when he enrolled in the doctoral program at Palmer Theological Seminary. He was a pastor from Cuba, and in my Personal Transformation class. I estimate, at the time Juan was in my class, he was 65 years old. He told the class the story of how, when he was a young pastor, the Castro regime moved to eliminate religion in Cuba. Juan and many other young pastors were arrested and placed in forced labor camps. Juan was there for several years. During the week of class I will never forget sitting in a Starbuck's with him and some other students, asking him the question "What was that like for you?", and hearing Juan describe life under atheism.
My second friend is Timothy Chung. Timothy is now 87 years old. When he was a young man in atheist-communist China, one day the authorities arrested him because he believed in God. Timothy was in prison for 21 years. He was hundreds of miles away from his wife and children. When Timothy spoke at our church he told the story of how his wife came to visit him (he saw her twice in 21 years). She took a train, and came carrying a bowl of rice for Timothy to eat. When she arrived, after traveling several hundred miles, the rice was rotten. Timothy said he ate it anyway. After 18 years in prison the authorities came to Timothy and told him that if he denied his faith in Jesus Christ, they would set him free. Timothy said, "I would rather spend the rest of my days in prison than deny Jesus."
Whenever I go to New York City to teach at Faith Bible Seminary, which is a Chinese seminary, I meet students who come from China and tell the stories of persecution under the atheistic regime that wants to eradicate, or control, religion. And, because students from all over the world have attended my classes at Palmer, I have heard other stories like this.
Such as, e.g., Jember Teffera, who was one of my students. Jember has been called "the Mother Teresa of Africa." Jember's husband, who was the mayor of Addis Ababa, was assassinated in a Marxist takeover of Ethiopia. Jember was imprisoned. It was there that she began her ministry to women and their daughters. It was my privilege to read Jember's spiritual journals, which she sent to me, as I functioned for a brief time as her spiritual director. It is heart-breaking to read of the tragedies she suffered under atheistic Marxism, and compelling as she writes of her faith in God in the midst of a movement dedicated to eliminating her faith.
What was clear to Juan, Timothy, and Jember, is that they all suffered under atheistic regimes dedicated to their eradication. Godlessness, as the "correct" ideology, abhorred God-belief.
Is atheism intrinsically more violent than theism? Dinesh D'Souza argues that "religion-inspired killing simply cannot compete with the murders perpetrated by atheistic regimes." He writes:
"I recognize that population levels were much lower in the past, and that it's much easier to kill people today with sophisticated weapons than it was in previous centuries with swords and arrows. Even taking higher population levels into account, atheist violence surpasses religious violence by staggering proportions. Here is a rough calculation. The world's population rose from around 500 million in 1450 AD to 2.5 billion in 1950, a fivefold increase. Taken together, the Crusades, the Inquisition, and the witch burnings killed approximately 200,000 people. Adjusting for the increase in population, that's the equivalent of one million deaths today. Even so, those deaths caused by Christian rulers over a five-hundred-year period amount to only 1 percent of the deaths caused by Stalin, *Hitler and Mao in the space of a few decades." (What's So Great About Christianity, 215)
When I first heard of some (not all) atheists who claimed that "religion" is the source of most of this world's evil I was stunned. How could such a naive claim be made, unless it was the work of political atheists who desired that religion be eradicated? If religious people were intrinsically evil, then it seems a short step to legislating their removal, if only by argument and ad hominisms. In the eyes of some atheists I live and breathe out of an evil worldview. Therefore I am dangerous.
As I see things, "religion" has made me a better person. While far from perfect, I am a more loving person today than when I was, at most, a deist. I have personally met hundreds of people of whom the same could be said. Jesus tells me to love even my enemies. That's my challenge today - to love in this way. For example the words of Jesus in Matthew 25 are the motivation behind my part in co-laboring with other local Christians to start our soup kitchen which feeds 100-200 people nightly. And, we're starting a food pantry this year that will ensure that no one in our community goes without food.
D-Souza writes:
"Whatever the cause for why atheist regimes do what they do, the indisputable fact is that all the religions of the world put together have in three thousand years not managed to kill anywhere near the number of people killed in the name of atheism in the past few decades." (Ib., 221)
Re. this quote, the debate will go back and forth on this. But when I read some atheists who seem to claim that no atheist regime has ever committed such atrocities, I find myself asking: then what happened to my friend Timothy in communist China?
*Was Hitler an atheist? Was Hitler a theist? I think, if the latter, Hitler's theism was nominal. See D'Souza, Ib., 217-221, where he takes on the arguments that claim Hitler was a religious person. See also the debate between D'Souza and Michael Shermer here. Watch the last segment at 29 minutes to see D'Souza on Hitler. D'Souza draws on historian Richard Weikart's From Darwin to Hitler: Evolutionary Ethics, Eugenics, and Racism in Germany(which I have not read).
I have friends who were persecuted under atheistic regimes.
The first is Juan. That's not his real name, since he still is a pastor in Cuba. I met Juan when he enrolled in the doctoral program at Palmer Theological Seminary. He was a pastor from Cuba, and in my Personal Transformation class. I estimate, at the time Juan was in my class, he was 65 years old. He told the class the story of how, when he was a young pastor, the Castro regime moved to eliminate religion in Cuba. Juan and many other young pastors were arrested and placed in forced labor camps. Juan was there for several years. During the week of class I will never forget sitting in a Starbuck's with him and some other students, asking him the question "What was that like for you?", and hearing Juan describe life under atheism.
My second friend is Timothy Chung. Timothy is now 87 years old. When he was a young man in atheist-communist China, one day the authorities arrested him because he believed in God. Timothy was in prison for 21 years. He was hundreds of miles away from his wife and children. When Timothy spoke at our church he told the story of how his wife came to visit him (he saw her twice in 21 years). She took a train, and came carrying a bowl of rice for Timothy to eat. When she arrived, after traveling several hundred miles, the rice was rotten. Timothy said he ate it anyway. After 18 years in prison the authorities came to Timothy and told him that if he denied his faith in Jesus Christ, they would set him free. Timothy said, "I would rather spend the rest of my days in prison than deny Jesus."
Whenever I go to New York City to teach at Faith Bible Seminary, which is a Chinese seminary, I meet students who come from China and tell the stories of persecution under the atheistic regime that wants to eradicate, or control, religion. And, because students from all over the world have attended my classes at Palmer, I have heard other stories like this.
Such as, e.g., Jember Teffera, who was one of my students. Jember has been called "the Mother Teresa of Africa." Jember's husband, who was the mayor of Addis Ababa, was assassinated in a Marxist takeover of Ethiopia. Jember was imprisoned. It was there that she began her ministry to women and their daughters. It was my privilege to read Jember's spiritual journals, which she sent to me, as I functioned for a brief time as her spiritual director. It is heart-breaking to read of the tragedies she suffered under atheistic Marxism, and compelling as she writes of her faith in God in the midst of a movement dedicated to eliminating her faith.
What was clear to Juan, Timothy, and Jember, is that they all suffered under atheistic regimes dedicated to their eradication. Godlessness, as the "correct" ideology, abhorred God-belief.
Is atheism intrinsically more violent than theism? Dinesh D'Souza argues that "religion-inspired killing simply cannot compete with the murders perpetrated by atheistic regimes." He writes:
"I recognize that population levels were much lower in the past, and that it's much easier to kill people today with sophisticated weapons than it was in previous centuries with swords and arrows. Even taking higher population levels into account, atheist violence surpasses religious violence by staggering proportions. Here is a rough calculation. The world's population rose from around 500 million in 1450 AD to 2.5 billion in 1950, a fivefold increase. Taken together, the Crusades, the Inquisition, and the witch burnings killed approximately 200,000 people. Adjusting for the increase in population, that's the equivalent of one million deaths today. Even so, those deaths caused by Christian rulers over a five-hundred-year period amount to only 1 percent of the deaths caused by Stalin, *Hitler and Mao in the space of a few decades." (What's So Great About Christianity, 215)
When I first heard of some (not all) atheists who claimed that "religion" is the source of most of this world's evil I was stunned. How could such a naive claim be made, unless it was the work of political atheists who desired that religion be eradicated? If religious people were intrinsically evil, then it seems a short step to legislating their removal, if only by argument and ad hominisms. In the eyes of some atheists I live and breathe out of an evil worldview. Therefore I am dangerous.
As I see things, "religion" has made me a better person. While far from perfect, I am a more loving person today than when I was, at most, a deist. I have personally met hundreds of people of whom the same could be said. Jesus tells me to love even my enemies. That's my challenge today - to love in this way. For example the words of Jesus in Matthew 25 are the motivation behind my part in co-laboring with other local Christians to start our soup kitchen which feeds 100-200 people nightly. And, we're starting a food pantry this year that will ensure that no one in our community goes without food.
D-Souza writes:
"Whatever the cause for why atheist regimes do what they do, the indisputable fact is that all the religions of the world put together have in three thousand years not managed to kill anywhere near the number of people killed in the name of atheism in the past few decades." (Ib., 221)
Re. this quote, the debate will go back and forth on this. But when I read some atheists who seem to claim that no atheist regime has ever committed such atrocities, I find myself asking: then what happened to my friend Timothy in communist China?
*Was Hitler an atheist? Was Hitler a theist? I think, if the latter, Hitler's theism was nominal. See D'Souza, Ib., 217-221, where he takes on the arguments that claim Hitler was a religious person. See also the debate between D'Souza and Michael Shermer here. Watch the last segment at 29 minutes to see D'Souza on Hitler. D'Souza draws on historian Richard Weikart's From Darwin to Hitler: Evolutionary Ethics, Eugenics, and Racism in Germany(which I have not read).
Wright's "Two Options" Re. the Resurrection Narratives
Obviously I am quite taken by nearly everything N.T. Wright writes. Scholars like this are, in my opinion, rare. Wright's comprehension of the requisite background knowledge is stunning, and his total life-immersion in the subject matter shows what can happen when a person life-dedicates themself to a focused area of study. If I could quote all 738 pages of his The Resurrection of the Son of God I would. This week I am into this book. So, here's some more Wright-stuff.
On pp. 608 ff. Wright is looking at the resurrection narratives in the gospels. He writes: "There are only two options that will account for these stories being what they are; and I find the first frankly incredible." Option #1 is: the resurrection stories are late inventions. Wright gives a number of examples here to argue against this explanation. Here's one. Matthew, Mark, Luke, and John share "the strange absence of any mention of the future post-mortem hope of Christians. Supposing a Christian group, or several individuals, who had pondered the developing resurrection-belief of the early church, not least as we see it in Paul, were to write a story about 'what really happened' as a way of turning into an aetiological myth the burgeoning belief that Jesus' resurrection was the model and the means for the future Christian hope." (610) By the 50s, Christians who thought of Jesus' resurrection also thought of their own resurrection. Arguably, were they to invent the resurrection story, they would have written in their hope of their own personal resurrection. Wright says: "It is completely unbelievable that four writers would have come up with very different Easter stories and that each one, by a kind of tacit agreement, would have omitted all mention of this increasingly important theme." (610) As another example, Wright believes that no one writing after twenty years, let alone thirty or forty, would have placed the women at the empty tomb. These and other examples argue against option #1.
Option #2 - "Try running the movie back to front... I find this second option more probable at the level of sheer history... The very strong historical probability is that, when Matthew, Luke and John describe the risen Jesus, they are writing down very early oral tradition, representing three different ways in which the original astonished participants told the story. These traditions have received only minimal development, and most of that probably at the final editorial stage, for the very good reason that stories as earth-shattering as this, stories as community-forming as this, once told, are not easily modified. Too much depends on them." (611)
Well, that's too much quoting of Wright and not enough explanation. Wright of course does give his reasons to support option #2. I especially love the series of rhetorical questions he asks on pp. 611-612, and felt tempted to quote it in its entirety.
It's important to note that, in all of this, Wright is not making an argument for the historical accuracy of the accounts. "It is," he says, "an argument for the accounts being chronologically as well as logically prior to the developed discussions of the resurrection which we find in Paul and many subsequent writers... [T]he strong probablity is that the Easter stories they contain go back to genuinely early oral tradition." (612)
On pp. 608 ff. Wright is looking at the resurrection narratives in the gospels. He writes: "There are only two options that will account for these stories being what they are; and I find the first frankly incredible." Option #1 is: the resurrection stories are late inventions. Wright gives a number of examples here to argue against this explanation. Here's one. Matthew, Mark, Luke, and John share "the strange absence of any mention of the future post-mortem hope of Christians. Supposing a Christian group, or several individuals, who had pondered the developing resurrection-belief of the early church, not least as we see it in Paul, were to write a story about 'what really happened' as a way of turning into an aetiological myth the burgeoning belief that Jesus' resurrection was the model and the means for the future Christian hope." (610) By the 50s, Christians who thought of Jesus' resurrection also thought of their own resurrection. Arguably, were they to invent the resurrection story, they would have written in their hope of their own personal resurrection. Wright says: "It is completely unbelievable that four writers would have come up with very different Easter stories and that each one, by a kind of tacit agreement, would have omitted all mention of this increasingly important theme." (610) As another example, Wright believes that no one writing after twenty years, let alone thirty or forty, would have placed the women at the empty tomb. These and other examples argue against option #1.
Option #2 - "Try running the movie back to front... I find this second option more probable at the level of sheer history... The very strong historical probability is that, when Matthew, Luke and John describe the risen Jesus, they are writing down very early oral tradition, representing three different ways in which the original astonished participants told the story. These traditions have received only minimal development, and most of that probably at the final editorial stage, for the very good reason that stories as earth-shattering as this, stories as community-forming as this, once told, are not easily modified. Too much depends on them." (611)
Well, that's too much quoting of Wright and not enough explanation. Wright of course does give his reasons to support option #2. I especially love the series of rhetorical questions he asks on pp. 611-612, and felt tempted to quote it in its entirety.
It's important to note that, in all of this, Wright is not making an argument for the historical accuracy of the accounts. "It is," he says, "an argument for the accounts being chronologically as well as logically prior to the developed discussions of the resurrection which we find in Paul and many subsequent writers... [T]he strong probablity is that the Easter stories they contain go back to genuinely early oral tradition." (612)
N.T. Wright On the Women At the Empty Tomb
("Empty Tomb," by He Qi)
I am filling up a good portion of my Easter week by reading the passion and Easter Gospel accounts, and adding to these ongoing studies things like N.T. Wright's massive, meticulous The Resurrection of the Son of God. Crucial to understanding Wright is his attempt to avoid an anachronistic approach that brings a modern fundamentalist hermeneutic to the text, and to read the text out of a hermeneutic that strives to be faithful to the time it was written and read.
I'm on p. 607, where Wright devotes some time to "the strange presence of women in the [resurrection] stories." Wright states: "It is, frankly, impossible to imagine that they were inserted into the tradition after Paul's day... Even if we suppose that mark made up most of his material, and did so some time in the late 60s at the earliest, it will not do to have him, or anyone else at that stage, making up a would-be apologetic legend about an empty tomb and having women be the ones to find it." One needs to appreciate the full impact of the point that "women were simply not acceptable as legal witnesses." (607)
Far better it would have been to have "fine, upstanding, reliable male witnesses being first at the tomb." (608) Critics of Christianity, as Origin and Celsus note, would have picked up on the story of the women and scoffed and the whole thing. Wright asks: "Would the other evangelists have been so slavishly foolish as to copy the story unless they were convinced that, despite being an apologetic liability, it was historically trustworthy?" (608)
Wright argues that this story "goes back behind Paul, back to the very early period, before anyone had the time to thnk, 'It would be good to tell stories about Jesus rising from the dead; what will best serve our apologetic needs?' It is far, far easier to assume that the women were there at the beginning, just as, three days earlier, they had been there at the end." (608)
A final note: all historical reasoning is inductive, probableistic. Therefore doubts can be raised. The raising of doubts in historical reasoning is to be expected. One can always find something to wonder about. Yet in this case it is more probable that the women were at the tomb than that this story was a later, made-up addition.
I am filling up a good portion of my Easter week by reading the passion and Easter Gospel accounts, and adding to these ongoing studies things like N.T. Wright's massive, meticulous The Resurrection of the Son of God. Crucial to understanding Wright is his attempt to avoid an anachronistic approach that brings a modern fundamentalist hermeneutic to the text, and to read the text out of a hermeneutic that strives to be faithful to the time it was written and read.
I'm on p. 607, where Wright devotes some time to "the strange presence of women in the [resurrection] stories." Wright states: "It is, frankly, impossible to imagine that they were inserted into the tradition after Paul's day... Even if we suppose that mark made up most of his material, and did so some time in the late 60s at the earliest, it will not do to have him, or anyone else at that stage, making up a would-be apologetic legend about an empty tomb and having women be the ones to find it." One needs to appreciate the full impact of the point that "women were simply not acceptable as legal witnesses." (607)
Far better it would have been to have "fine, upstanding, reliable male witnesses being first at the tomb." (608) Critics of Christianity, as Origin and Celsus note, would have picked up on the story of the women and scoffed and the whole thing. Wright asks: "Would the other evangelists have been so slavishly foolish as to copy the story unless they were convinced that, despite being an apologetic liability, it was historically trustworthy?" (608)
Wright argues that this story "goes back behind Paul, back to the very early period, before anyone had the time to thnk, 'It would be good to tell stories about Jesus rising from the dead; what will best serve our apologetic needs?' It is far, far easier to assume that the women were there at the beginning, just as, three days earlier, they had been there at the end." (608)
A final note: all historical reasoning is inductive, probableistic. Therefore doubts can be raised. The raising of doubts in historical reasoning is to be expected. One can always find something to wonder about. Yet in this case it is more probable that the women were at the tomb than that this story was a later, made-up addition.
Monday, March 29, 2010
Is the Jesus-Story a Legend?
(The Lake of Galilee)
Some time ago I was dialoguing about the historical Jesus on our city newspaper's chat area. My dialogue partner wrote the following:
"I do not believe Jesus was a real person. I believe the Jesus of the Bible is a mish-mash of previous “Sons of God” or “Sun Gods” such as Osiris, Mithras or Dionysus, all were born of virgins, all were martyred. All were resurrected. It’s just a re-telling of the old tales into a new tale. Take Saul (Paul). When he was talking about Jesus, he didn’t even know if a physical Jesus existed. He was talking about the spiritual entity. He didn’t even know he was supposedly Crucified or the “Christmas” story."
OK. Not the most scholarly thing to write. But, thanks to the internet, there are some people who buy into this kind of thing. To the idea that the Jesus-story is "just a re-telling of an old tale" I would say things like the following, a lot of which is directly taken from two books by Greg Boyd and George : 1) The Jesus Legend: A Case for the Historical Reliability of the Synoptic Jesus Tradition; and 2) Lord or Legend: Wrestling With the Jesus Dilemma. I have also used material from N.T. Wright's The Resurrection of the Son of God.
#1 – The similarities between the Jesus-story and existing legends are superficial at most.
Some of the legends sound like the Jesus story. There are, for example, legends of others being born of a virgin. And, there are legends of others that were said to have risen from the dead. But if you examine these parallels in detail, you find that most of the commonalities are superficial.
For example, one of the legends frequently cited by legendary-Jesus theorists “concerns a second-century itinerant teacher and wonder-worker named Apollonius of Tyana.” (Boyd & Eddy, Lord or Legend?, 56) This legend says that Apollonius rose from the dead. This is written by Philostratus, who’s writing 150 years after Appolonius lived. The supposed resurrection comes down to this: There’s a lady who had a dream. Appolonius appeared to her in a dream.
But that’s not a resurrection. It is, perhaps, a post-mortem vision. But this has nothing in common with the Gospel stories, which has Jesus hanging out with people for 40 days, having breakfast with his disciples, and letting someone feel his side.
There are legends about others having a virgin birth, like Plato supposedly had a virgin birth. The virgin-birth legends all happen after Christianity has spread into the world. People saw Christians claiming that Jesus had a virgin birth, so they begin to claim that their hero had a virgin birth to compete with Christianity. (See N.T. Wright, The Resurrection of the Son of God)
Re. so-called “similar” myths, Boyd, Eddy, and Wright all argue that when you get down to the details there’s very little in common.
#2 - Legends usually take a lot of time to develop. (See Boyd & Eddy, both references) A story gets told and told and retold, like a fish story that grows over time. Typically, that’s what happens with legends. They take decades and even centuries to evolve, even a millennium. For example, the legends about Buddha are all more than 500 years after his life. The same is true of Plato, Alexander the Great, and others. But when it comes to Jesus, you don’t have a millennium. In fact, you don’t even have decades. You don’t have enough time for a legend to develop.
The first person to write about Jesus is the apostle Paul. Paul is writing two decades after Jesus lived. He is writing when people still are alive and who remember Jesus. So, there are real, historical figures involved, such as Caiaphas the high priest, and Joseph of Arimathea, who was a member of the Sanhedrin. These and others are people who lived and were contemporary with people who were still alive when Paul wrote. The question then becomes: How could you have a legend evolve about a man if He’s just a normal carpenter, and in just 10-15 years he is now the “Son of God?” How do you explain that… when his brother James is still alive? In fact, how do you explain it when you have people laying down their lives for this story? (See Lord or Legend?, 43)
Boyd and Eddy contend that the legend-hypothesis does not work because you don’t have enough time for Jesus to become "legendary."
Reason #3 – You also have the wrong culture.
Boyd and Eddy say that, when it comes to being receptive to legends, not all cultures are equal. For example our culture, on the whole, is quite resistant to legends. Most people don’t believe most of the legends that go around. Other cultures are more receptive to legends. First-century Judaism, however, was resistant to legends. They had the Torah. It was the pagans who told the stories and the legends.
Usually, when legends evolve, there’s a sociological need that’s being met. Legends evolve to support traditional beliefs. The legend reinforces what they already believe. The story of Jesus doesn’t fit any of the cultural beliefs very well. In fact, Jesus flies in the face of established beliefs in first-century Judaism. He is conflicting with many of these beliefs. For example, the Jews believed God was God and humans were humans, and never the twain shall meet. The idea that God would become man is off-the-charts blasphemous. This, claim Boyd and Eddy, is not the stuff of “legends.”
Legends confirm traditional beliefs; they do not confront traditional beliefs. The Jews believed in military Messiah. Instead, Jesus gets crucified. It would be hard to make a story more implausible than this. The Jesus story is not about Jewish “heroes.” In fact, the disciples look positively ignorant.
In this regard C.S. Lewis, whose area of scholarship was mythology, said, basically (to paraphrase): “I know mythology. If there’s one thing the 4 Gospels are not, it’s mythology.” So, it seems that the legendary hypothesis does not work for a number of reasons.
N.T. Wright comments, in depth, on the “dying and rising God” myth. It’s false. Here’s why. But first note: If you want to read much more see N.T. Wright’s The Resurrection of the Son of God, Ch. 2, “Shadows, Souls, and Where They Go: Life Beyond Death in Ancient Paganism.” Wright combines excellent scholarship with clear writing to show that the idea that, e.g., Osiris, Mithras, and Dionysus et. al. “were [mythically] resurrected” is false because a misunderstanding of the meaning of ‘resurrection.’ In the ancient world in which Judeo-Christianity was situated “’resurrection’ was not an option.” (Wright, 60)
“Resurrection,” in the Judeo-Christian sense, means: “a new embodied life which would follow whatever ‘life after death’ might be.” (Wright, 83) The Greco-Roman world assumed that such a thing was impossible.
The Isis, Osiris, and Dionysus myths are affiliated with fertility rites and “productivity of the soil.” (Ib., 80) These gods “died and rose” every year. “The new life they might thereby experience was not a return to the life of the present world.” Nobody actually expected the mummies to get up, walk about and resume normal living: nobody in that world would have wanted such a thing, either.” (Ib., 80-81)
“When the Christians spoke of the resurrection of Jesus they did not suppose it was something that happened every year, with the sowing of seed and the harvesting of crops. They could use the image of sowing and harvesting to talk about it; they could celebrate Jesus’ death by breaking bread; but to confuse this with the world of the dying and rising gods would be a serious mistake… When Paul preached in Athens, nobody said, ‘Ah, yes, a new version of Osiris and such like. The Homeric assumption remained in force. Whatever the gods – or the crops – might do, humans did not rise again from the dead.” (Ib., 81)
The two greatest influences on the Greco-Roman worldview were Plato and Homer. For Plato ‘resurrection’ was a detestable thought; for Homer an impossible thing. The Christian idea of resurrection is antithetical to Platonic thinking because the human body, for Plato, is a “prison” and no one would want to inhabit it again after death. For Homer the dead are “shades,” “ghosts,” “phantoms.” “They are in no way fully human beings, though they may look like them; the appearance is deceptive, since one cannot grasp them physically.” (Ib., 43)
The Egyptian Osiris myth has no concept of “resurrection” in it as Christians understood it. Egyptian mummification assumes the person is “still ‘alive’ in some bodily sense, despite appearances.” “’Resurrection’ is an inappropriate word for Egyptian belief.” (Ib., 47).
There is a lot of reasoning and many cited resources in Wright’s chapter. He concludes with three things.
1. “When the early Christians spoke of Jesus being raised from the dead, the natural meaning of that statement, throughout the ancient world, was the claim that something had happened to Jesus which had happened to nobody else. A great many things supposedly happened to the dead, but resurrection did not.” (Ib., 83)
2. “The early Christian belief that Jesus was in some sense divine cannot have been the cause of the belief in his resurrection…. Divinization did not require resurrection; it regularly happened without it. It involved the soul, not the body.” (Ib.)
3. The ancient non-Judeo-Christian world took the Judeo-Christian term ‘resurrection,’ which referred to something hardly anyone believed in, “and used it to denote something a great many people believed in”; viz., non-bodily life after death.
Wright writes: This “was a variation that attempted to retain Christian language about Jesus, and about the future destiny of Christians, whole filling it with non-Christian, and for that matter non-Jewish, content. If this mutation had been the norm, and belief in bodily resurrection the odd variant, why would anyone have invented the latter? And why would not Celsus have pointed this all out?” (Ib., 84)
Did Jesus of Nazareth actually exist? Craig Evans writes: "No serious historian of any religious or nonreligious stripe doubts that Jesus of Nazareth really lived in the first century and was executed under the authority of Pontius Pilate, the governor of Judea and Samaria. Though this may be common knowledge among scholars, the public may well not be aware of this." (Craig Evans and N.T. Wright, Jesus, The Final Days: What Really Happened, 3)
Finally, a truly thorough presentation of the historicity of the Gospel accounts must include Richard Bauckham's masterpiece Jesus and the Eyewitnesses: The Gospels and Eyewitness Testimony, which argues that "the Gospels embody eyewitness testimony." (114)
Some time ago I was dialoguing about the historical Jesus on our city newspaper's chat area. My dialogue partner wrote the following:
"I do not believe Jesus was a real person. I believe the Jesus of the Bible is a mish-mash of previous “Sons of God” or “Sun Gods” such as Osiris, Mithras or Dionysus, all were born of virgins, all were martyred. All were resurrected. It’s just a re-telling of the old tales into a new tale. Take Saul (Paul). When he was talking about Jesus, he didn’t even know if a physical Jesus existed. He was talking about the spiritual entity. He didn’t even know he was supposedly Crucified or the “Christmas” story."
OK. Not the most scholarly thing to write. But, thanks to the internet, there are some people who buy into this kind of thing. To the idea that the Jesus-story is "just a re-telling of an old tale" I would say things like the following, a lot of which is directly taken from two books by Greg Boyd and George : 1) The Jesus Legend: A Case for the Historical Reliability of the Synoptic Jesus Tradition; and 2) Lord or Legend: Wrestling With the Jesus Dilemma. I have also used material from N.T. Wright's The Resurrection of the Son of God.
#1 – The similarities between the Jesus-story and existing legends are superficial at most.
Some of the legends sound like the Jesus story. There are, for example, legends of others being born of a virgin. And, there are legends of others that were said to have risen from the dead. But if you examine these parallels in detail, you find that most of the commonalities are superficial.
For example, one of the legends frequently cited by legendary-Jesus theorists “concerns a second-century itinerant teacher and wonder-worker named Apollonius of Tyana.” (Boyd & Eddy, Lord or Legend?, 56) This legend says that Apollonius rose from the dead. This is written by Philostratus, who’s writing 150 years after Appolonius lived. The supposed resurrection comes down to this: There’s a lady who had a dream. Appolonius appeared to her in a dream.
But that’s not a resurrection. It is, perhaps, a post-mortem vision. But this has nothing in common with the Gospel stories, which has Jesus hanging out with people for 40 days, having breakfast with his disciples, and letting someone feel his side.
There are legends about others having a virgin birth, like Plato supposedly had a virgin birth. The virgin-birth legends all happen after Christianity has spread into the world. People saw Christians claiming that Jesus had a virgin birth, so they begin to claim that their hero had a virgin birth to compete with Christianity. (See N.T. Wright, The Resurrection of the Son of God)
Re. so-called “similar” myths, Boyd, Eddy, and Wright all argue that when you get down to the details there’s very little in common.
#2 - Legends usually take a lot of time to develop. (See Boyd & Eddy, both references) A story gets told and told and retold, like a fish story that grows over time. Typically, that’s what happens with legends. They take decades and even centuries to evolve, even a millennium. For example, the legends about Buddha are all more than 500 years after his life. The same is true of Plato, Alexander the Great, and others. But when it comes to Jesus, you don’t have a millennium. In fact, you don’t even have decades. You don’t have enough time for a legend to develop.
The first person to write about Jesus is the apostle Paul. Paul is writing two decades after Jesus lived. He is writing when people still are alive and who remember Jesus. So, there are real, historical figures involved, such as Caiaphas the high priest, and Joseph of Arimathea, who was a member of the Sanhedrin. These and others are people who lived and were contemporary with people who were still alive when Paul wrote. The question then becomes: How could you have a legend evolve about a man if He’s just a normal carpenter, and in just 10-15 years he is now the “Son of God?” How do you explain that… when his brother James is still alive? In fact, how do you explain it when you have people laying down their lives for this story? (See Lord or Legend?, 43)
Boyd and Eddy contend that the legend-hypothesis does not work because you don’t have enough time for Jesus to become "legendary."
Reason #3 – You also have the wrong culture.
Boyd and Eddy say that, when it comes to being receptive to legends, not all cultures are equal. For example our culture, on the whole, is quite resistant to legends. Most people don’t believe most of the legends that go around. Other cultures are more receptive to legends. First-century Judaism, however, was resistant to legends. They had the Torah. It was the pagans who told the stories and the legends.
Usually, when legends evolve, there’s a sociological need that’s being met. Legends evolve to support traditional beliefs. The legend reinforces what they already believe. The story of Jesus doesn’t fit any of the cultural beliefs very well. In fact, Jesus flies in the face of established beliefs in first-century Judaism. He is conflicting with many of these beliefs. For example, the Jews believed God was God and humans were humans, and never the twain shall meet. The idea that God would become man is off-the-charts blasphemous. This, claim Boyd and Eddy, is not the stuff of “legends.”
Legends confirm traditional beliefs; they do not confront traditional beliefs. The Jews believed in military Messiah. Instead, Jesus gets crucified. It would be hard to make a story more implausible than this. The Jesus story is not about Jewish “heroes.” In fact, the disciples look positively ignorant.
In this regard C.S. Lewis, whose area of scholarship was mythology, said, basically (to paraphrase): “I know mythology. If there’s one thing the 4 Gospels are not, it’s mythology.” So, it seems that the legendary hypothesis does not work for a number of reasons.
N.T. Wright comments, in depth, on the “dying and rising God” myth. It’s false. Here’s why. But first note: If you want to read much more see N.T. Wright’s The Resurrection of the Son of God, Ch. 2, “Shadows, Souls, and Where They Go: Life Beyond Death in Ancient Paganism.” Wright combines excellent scholarship with clear writing to show that the idea that, e.g., Osiris, Mithras, and Dionysus et. al. “were [mythically] resurrected” is false because a misunderstanding of the meaning of ‘resurrection.’ In the ancient world in which Judeo-Christianity was situated “’resurrection’ was not an option.” (Wright, 60)
“Resurrection,” in the Judeo-Christian sense, means: “a new embodied life which would follow whatever ‘life after death’ might be.” (Wright, 83) The Greco-Roman world assumed that such a thing was impossible.
The Isis, Osiris, and Dionysus myths are affiliated with fertility rites and “productivity of the soil.” (Ib., 80) These gods “died and rose” every year. “The new life they might thereby experience was not a return to the life of the present world.” Nobody actually expected the mummies to get up, walk about and resume normal living: nobody in that world would have wanted such a thing, either.” (Ib., 80-81)
“When the Christians spoke of the resurrection of Jesus they did not suppose it was something that happened every year, with the sowing of seed and the harvesting of crops. They could use the image of sowing and harvesting to talk about it; they could celebrate Jesus’ death by breaking bread; but to confuse this with the world of the dying and rising gods would be a serious mistake… When Paul preached in Athens, nobody said, ‘Ah, yes, a new version of Osiris and such like. The Homeric assumption remained in force. Whatever the gods – or the crops – might do, humans did not rise again from the dead.” (Ib., 81)
The two greatest influences on the Greco-Roman worldview were Plato and Homer. For Plato ‘resurrection’ was a detestable thought; for Homer an impossible thing. The Christian idea of resurrection is antithetical to Platonic thinking because the human body, for Plato, is a “prison” and no one would want to inhabit it again after death. For Homer the dead are “shades,” “ghosts,” “phantoms.” “They are in no way fully human beings, though they may look like them; the appearance is deceptive, since one cannot grasp them physically.” (Ib., 43)
The Egyptian Osiris myth has no concept of “resurrection” in it as Christians understood it. Egyptian mummification assumes the person is “still ‘alive’ in some bodily sense, despite appearances.” “’Resurrection’ is an inappropriate word for Egyptian belief.” (Ib., 47).
There is a lot of reasoning and many cited resources in Wright’s chapter. He concludes with three things.
1. “When the early Christians spoke of Jesus being raised from the dead, the natural meaning of that statement, throughout the ancient world, was the claim that something had happened to Jesus which had happened to nobody else. A great many things supposedly happened to the dead, but resurrection did not.” (Ib., 83)
2. “The early Christian belief that Jesus was in some sense divine cannot have been the cause of the belief in his resurrection…. Divinization did not require resurrection; it regularly happened without it. It involved the soul, not the body.” (Ib.)
3. The ancient non-Judeo-Christian world took the Judeo-Christian term ‘resurrection,’ which referred to something hardly anyone believed in, “and used it to denote something a great many people believed in”; viz., non-bodily life after death.
Wright writes: This “was a variation that attempted to retain Christian language about Jesus, and about the future destiny of Christians, whole filling it with non-Christian, and for that matter non-Jewish, content. If this mutation had been the norm, and belief in bodily resurrection the odd variant, why would anyone have invented the latter? And why would not Celsus have pointed this all out?” (Ib., 84)
Did Jesus of Nazareth actually exist? Craig Evans writes: "No serious historian of any religious or nonreligious stripe doubts that Jesus of Nazareth really lived in the first century and was executed under the authority of Pontius Pilate, the governor of Judea and Samaria. Though this may be common knowledge among scholars, the public may well not be aware of this." (Craig Evans and N.T. Wright, Jesus, The Final Days: What Really Happened, 3)
Finally, a truly thorough presentation of the historicity of the Gospel accounts must include Richard Bauckham's masterpiece Jesus and the Eyewitnesses: The Gospels and Eyewitness Testimony, which argues that "the Gospels embody eyewitness testimony." (114)
Redeemer Ministry School - Apologetics
On Wednesday in Redeemer Ministry School I will begin teaching my Apologetics class. The word "apologetics" does not mean learning how to say things like, "I'm really sorry I'm a follower of Jesus" (as your shame-filled head hangs down). The Greek word apologeo is found in 1 Peter 3:15: "in your hearts set apart Christ as Lord. Always be prepared to give an answer to everyone who asks you to give the reason for the hope that you have. But do this with gentleness and respect." Here in the NIV apologeo is translated as "to give an answer." It can also be translated as "to make a defense," or "to make an argument."
I love teaching apologetics! As a new Jesus-follower (40 years ago!) one of the first books I read was C.S. Lewis's Mere Christianity. I was fascinated by Lewis's reasoning. It had such an impact on me that I changed my college major from music theory to philosophy. "Philosophy" was where the action was in terms of addressing the big questions of life. To this day, this has not changed for me. (I will add theology and religious studies, of course.)
William Lane Craig was my campus pastor, and began introducing me to apologetics. I have followed Bill's career and writings since then, and often thank God for the opportunity to be mentored by him in my early philosophical days.
On this Wednesday I am going to present, to my RMS students, an extranbiblical defense for the resurrection of Jesus. I'll follow a lot of Bill's reasoning here, plus add some other things.
For the second part of my Wed. class I will present the case for the existence of Jesus. A current internet-atheist thing is to claim, and argue for the idea that Jesus never existed. I'll show our students why such reasoning is specious.
(If you are intersted in attending Redeemer Ministry school for our 2010-2011 school year, please check out the information here.)
I love teaching apologetics! As a new Jesus-follower (40 years ago!) one of the first books I read was C.S. Lewis's Mere Christianity. I was fascinated by Lewis's reasoning. It had such an impact on me that I changed my college major from music theory to philosophy. "Philosophy" was where the action was in terms of addressing the big questions of life. To this day, this has not changed for me. (I will add theology and religious studies, of course.)
William Lane Craig was my campus pastor, and began introducing me to apologetics. I have followed Bill's career and writings since then, and often thank God for the opportunity to be mentored by him in my early philosophical days.
On this Wednesday I am going to present, to my RMS students, an extranbiblical defense for the resurrection of Jesus. I'll follow a lot of Bill's reasoning here, plus add some other things.
For the second part of my Wed. class I will present the case for the existence of Jesus. A current internet-atheist thing is to claim, and argue for the idea that Jesus never existed. I'll show our students why such reasoning is specious.
(If you are intersted in attending Redeemer Ministry school for our 2010-2011 school year, please check out the information here.)
Philosophy of Religion - Oral Exam #2
For my Philosophy of Religion Students
Oral exams will be in room Z 272.
Exams are held Wed., March 31, and Monday, April 5.
The oral exam questions are:
1) Mackie's logical argument from evil against the existence of God
2) Buddhism's idea of evil as illusion
3) Plantinga's defeat of Mackie's logical argument
4) Rowe's evidential argument from evil against the existence of God
5) Wyckstra's "no-seeum" argument against Rowe
Extra credit (if needed): David Chalmers's zombie argument against physicalism
Oral exams will be in room Z 272.
Exams are held Wed., March 31, and Monday, April 5.
The oral exam questions are:
1) Mackie's logical argument from evil against the existence of God
2) Buddhism's idea of evil as illusion
3) Plantinga's defeat of Mackie's logical argument
4) Rowe's evidential argument from evil against the existence of God
5) Wyckstra's "no-seeum" argument against Rowe
Extra credit (if needed): David Chalmers's zombie argument against physicalism
The Euthyphro Dilemma
I very much like William Lane Craig's version of the moral argument for the existence of God. One response the atheist may give to this argument is to bring up Plato's famous "Euthyphro Dilemma." We are, supposedly, presented with two horns of a dilemma; this we are going to get gored any way we answer. Horn #1 is: God commands what is good because he sees that it is good. Horn #2 is: Something is good because God commands it. If we embrace Horn #1 then we must admit that there is something outside of God, which can be called good. If we accept Horn #2, then we must admit that the commands of God are arbitrary.
Craig argues that this is a false dilemma, because there is a third alternative; viz., that God commands what is good because he is good. That is, the essence of God is goodness. God is necessarily good. "Goodness" is an essential attribute of the being of God. Craig writes:
"So moral values are not independent of God because God’s own character defines what is good. God is essentially compassionate, fair, kind, impartial, and so on. His nature is the moral standard determining good and bad. His commands necessarily reflect in turn his moral nature. Therefore, they are not arbitrary. The morally good/bad is determined by God’s nature, and the morally right/wrong is determined by his will. God wills something because he is good, and something is right because God wills it.This view of morality has been eloquently defended in our day by such well-known philosophers as Robert Adams, William Alston, and Philip Quinn."
Saturday, March 27, 2010
Trust As the Cure for Anxiety & Fear
I've had the office chair I am now sitting in for 17 years. I trust it. I trust that it will hold me. Therefore I have no anxiety in regard to it. Where there is complete trust, one finds no anxiety. It would be contradictory to say "I trust this chair I'm sitting in, but am afraid it won't hold me." Where there is trust, there is no fear.
There are objects of significant trust, and objects of insignificant trust. Objects of significant trust affect me; objects of insignificant trust have no effect on me. I may not trust the motives of Tiger Woods, but my mistrust does not cause me anxiety or fear because I am unaffected by his actions. But I do not trust where the economy is heading, and may wonder whether or not I will have sufficient funds to meet my needs in retirement. This can breed anxiety and fear. Indeed, some people take their lives over this one. I am significantly affected by economic conditions, and these conditions are largely out of my control. To not have control over an object of significant trust can cause fear.
An object of significant trust is so because of its affect on me. If my office chair falls apart while I am sitting in it, I am affected. If, on the other side of the world, someone's office chair just broke and a person fell on their tailbone, I can be sympathetic if I hear of this, but I will not be anxious or fearful in regard to it. But if that person is my son, I may feel anxious.
Do you find yourself mostly filled with anxiety and fear? The reason is: you do not *trust. In life, I have placed my trust in God. I do this daily, even hourly. The result of doing this for forty years now has been a life of less fear and anxiety. I'm not saying I never freak out about something. I am saying that when I do freak out, it's a certainty that I am not trusting.
I believe there is a cumulative effect that results from a lifetime of trusting in God. A psychological confidence, even certitude, emerges. It is like the confidence one gains as a result of sitting in the same office chair for 17 years and finding that, through it all, it still holds.
"Trust in the Lord with all your heart. Don't lean on your own understanding. In all your ways acknowledge God. And God will make straight your paths." - Proverbs 3:5-6
*I recognize that there are clinical conditions that neurophysically cause anxiety and fear. The antidote for such conditions may be medications. But even when medications stabilize a person's emotions, issues of trust still remain. Medication will not help a person when the only chair they have keeps breaking. The antidote then becomes: find another chair to place your trust in and your posterior on.
There are objects of significant trust, and objects of insignificant trust. Objects of significant trust affect me; objects of insignificant trust have no effect on me. I may not trust the motives of Tiger Woods, but my mistrust does not cause me anxiety or fear because I am unaffected by his actions. But I do not trust where the economy is heading, and may wonder whether or not I will have sufficient funds to meet my needs in retirement. This can breed anxiety and fear. Indeed, some people take their lives over this one. I am significantly affected by economic conditions, and these conditions are largely out of my control. To not have control over an object of significant trust can cause fear.
An object of significant trust is so because of its affect on me. If my office chair falls apart while I am sitting in it, I am affected. If, on the other side of the world, someone's office chair just broke and a person fell on their tailbone, I can be sympathetic if I hear of this, but I will not be anxious or fearful in regard to it. But if that person is my son, I may feel anxious.
Do you find yourself mostly filled with anxiety and fear? The reason is: you do not *trust. In life, I have placed my trust in God. I do this daily, even hourly. The result of doing this for forty years now has been a life of less fear and anxiety. I'm not saying I never freak out about something. I am saying that when I do freak out, it's a certainty that I am not trusting.
I believe there is a cumulative effect that results from a lifetime of trusting in God. A psychological confidence, even certitude, emerges. It is like the confidence one gains as a result of sitting in the same office chair for 17 years and finding that, through it all, it still holds.
"Trust in the Lord with all your heart. Don't lean on your own understanding. In all your ways acknowledge God. And God will make straight your paths." - Proverbs 3:5-6
*I recognize that there are clinical conditions that neurophysically cause anxiety and fear. The antidote for such conditions may be medications. But even when medications stabilize a person's emotions, issues of trust still remain. Medication will not help a person when the only chair they have keeps breaking. The antidote then becomes: find another chair to place your trust in and your posterior on.
Friday, March 26, 2010
Me, Two Buddhists, a Muslim, a Roman Catholic nun, and an Atheist
I'll be at MCCC's La-Z-Boy Center auditorium with these panelists April 22, to discuss the problem of evil. They're going to correct the misspelling of my last name when this flyer gets posted next week. It should be interesting. Mary Hungerman has a Ph.D, a Muslim surgeon, two Buddhists, and an atheist. Could it be more diverse? :)
Why Science Can't Tell Us Everything
(My favorite coffee cup, given to me by one of our MSU students, circa 1982. The handle broke off years ago. Coffee tastes better in this cup than in others!)
On occasion I read or talk with someone who has the over-inflated and naive idea that "science" can tell us "everything." It cannot. Here's why.
Particle physicist John Polkinghorne was Professor of Mathematical Physics at the University of Cambridge, and the discoverer of quarks. In a recent interview Polkinghorne states: "Scientists who make arrogant claims that science tells you everything worth knowing are making a boastful claim that just doesn’t stand up. Science tells us how the world works, but it really doesn’t try to tell us about matters of meaning or value or purpose, which are equally important." The science can do things like weigh, measure, analyze properties, and quantify. For example, a scientist could weigh the coffee cup that is now before me. He could analyze its molecular composition. But when the scientist says "That's a very nice coffee cup," at that point he has left science and entered into the world of value, meaning, and purpose.
Take, e.g., the statement Science has value. In itself, that is not something science could discover. The scientist cannot take his analytic tools and find "value" in the way Polkinghorne found quarks. The statement Science tells us everything cannot be true since it is itself a non-scientific statement. So, since meaning, value, and purpose are important, and science cannot give us answers in these areas, we must look elsewhere. Welcome to the worlds of religion and philosophy.
Could value, meaning, and purpose be emergent properties of the physical brain? (Which would mean they are irreducible with respect to the physical brain.) With this question we enter into what Owen Flanagan and others call the "really hard problem of finding meaning in a material world." Underline the words "really hard." The matter is hard because science only studies material events, of which meaning, value, and purpose are not. But discussions of meaning, value, and purpose abound and are inextricably part of what it is to be human. If you think what I have just written is "nonsense" your claim is non-scientific. Here scholars like Polkinghorne and Flanagan, while respecting science and knowing its limits, turn to the "humanities."
On occasion I read or talk with someone who has the over-inflated and naive idea that "science" can tell us "everything." It cannot. Here's why.
Particle physicist John Polkinghorne was Professor of Mathematical Physics at the University of Cambridge, and the discoverer of quarks. In a recent interview Polkinghorne states: "Scientists who make arrogant claims that science tells you everything worth knowing are making a boastful claim that just doesn’t stand up. Science tells us how the world works, but it really doesn’t try to tell us about matters of meaning or value or purpose, which are equally important." The science can do things like weigh, measure, analyze properties, and quantify. For example, a scientist could weigh the coffee cup that is now before me. He could analyze its molecular composition. But when the scientist says "That's a very nice coffee cup," at that point he has left science and entered into the world of value, meaning, and purpose.
Take, e.g., the statement Science has value. In itself, that is not something science could discover. The scientist cannot take his analytic tools and find "value" in the way Polkinghorne found quarks. The statement Science tells us everything cannot be true since it is itself a non-scientific statement. So, since meaning, value, and purpose are important, and science cannot give us answers in these areas, we must look elsewhere. Welcome to the worlds of religion and philosophy.
Could value, meaning, and purpose be emergent properties of the physical brain? (Which would mean they are irreducible with respect to the physical brain.) With this question we enter into what Owen Flanagan and others call the "really hard problem of finding meaning in a material world." Underline the words "really hard." The matter is hard because science only studies material events, of which meaning, value, and purpose are not. But discussions of meaning, value, and purpose abound and are inextricably part of what it is to be human. If you think what I have just written is "nonsense" your claim is non-scientific. Here scholars like Polkinghorne and Flanagan, while respecting science and knowing its limits, turn to the "humanities."
Thursday, March 25, 2010
Linda Piippo at Newport Beach Cafe
This Friday night at Newport Beach Cafe my beautiful wife Linda will be preaching. Kellie Robinson will lead worship.
9 PM
Redeemer Ministry School - Holly Benner & Gary Wilson Teach History of Worship
Holly Benner and Gary Wilson will begin teaching our Worship III class in Redeemer Ministry School tomorrow morning.
Holly is our Worship Leader and, in my estimation, one of the great worship leaders of today. She's not only a talented keyboardist with a beautiful voice, but a growing scholar in the area of worship. And, she's a great songwriter! We're expecting her cd to be ready for our Randy Clark Conference in late June.
Gary is Professor of Art at Monroe County Community College. He's an extremely talented and creative artist him. When you add to this Gary's deep biblical knowledge and ever-growing faith in Jesus, you have an exceptional combination. I am especially excited about the new revelatory things Gary is teaching. I've never heard such insights before in my life.
All students who study with Holly and Gary will be doubly blessed!
Worship III - History of Worship
Description: How do the previous moves of God affect the way that we worship God today? Beginning with the Old Testament, we will look at how history up to the present day has brought us to what God is doing now in worship. We will study the tabernacle of Moses, the tabernacle of David, the temple of Solomon and how they relate to the new covenant given in the New Testament. Other topics will include studies of revivals in history - how God moved, and how His people responded in worship.
Meeting Information: Friday; 9:30am - 1:00pm
For more information contact: 734-242-5277
Holly is our Worship Leader and, in my estimation, one of the great worship leaders of today. She's not only a talented keyboardist with a beautiful voice, but a growing scholar in the area of worship. And, she's a great songwriter! We're expecting her cd to be ready for our Randy Clark Conference in late June.
Gary is Professor of Art at Monroe County Community College. He's an extremely talented and creative artist him. When you add to this Gary's deep biblical knowledge and ever-growing faith in Jesus, you have an exceptional combination. I am especially excited about the new revelatory things Gary is teaching. I've never heard such insights before in my life.
All students who study with Holly and Gary will be doubly blessed!
Worship III - History of Worship
Description: How do the previous moves of God affect the way that we worship God today? Beginning with the Old Testament, we will look at how history up to the present day has brought us to what God is doing now in worship. We will study the tabernacle of Moses, the tabernacle of David, the temple of Solomon and how they relate to the new covenant given in the New Testament. Other topics will include studies of revivals in history - how God moved, and how His people responded in worship.
Meeting Information: Friday; 9:30am - 1:00pm
For more information contact: 734-242-5277
Redeemer Ministry School - Jim Hunter Teaches Leadership
I've attended a lot of leadership seminars over the years. Last spring I took Jim Hunter's Leadership class. For me, this was the best leadership training and empowering experience I have ever had, both in terms of content and experiential application. Jim is literally all over the world, by invitation, to teach leadership. All students in this class will gain many things that will last a lifetime.
At Redeemer Ministry School - first class is tonight, 5 PM.
LEADERSHIP
Description: This course will introduce students to servant leadership principles. Our basic assumption will be: leaders for Christ are themselves led by Christ. Students will not only study leadership principles but will engage in the practice of authentic servant leadership.
Meeting Information: Thursday; 5:00pm - 7:00pm
Instructor: Jim Hunter
For information call: 734-242-5277
At Redeemer Ministry School - first class is tonight, 5 PM.
LEADERSHIP
Description: This course will introduce students to servant leadership principles. Our basic assumption will be: leaders for Christ are themselves led by Christ. Students will not only study leadership principles but will engage in the practice of authentic servant leadership.
Meeting Information: Thursday; 5:00pm - 7:00pm
Instructor: Jim Hunter
For information call: 734-242-5277
A.J. Ayer Was Nicer After He Died
Way back in the 1970s, as a philosophy undergraduate, I read A.J. Ayer's Language, Truth and Logic. Ayer, an atheist, was a logical positivist, and famous for his "verification principle." The verification principle eliminated, as cognitively meaningful, metaphysical philosophy. I was a new Christian, and interested in metaphysics. The v-principle set me off on a course of studies in analytic philosophy and philosophy of language, to include reading Wittgenstein, J.L. Austin, and issues in "the problem of religious language." This area of study has never ceased to intrigue me, and on the way to today I did my doctoral dissertation on metaphor theory, relating it to Ayerian issues of language and cognitive meaning.
I just read Peter Foges's "An Atheist Meets the Masters of the Universe," an essay on A.J. Ayer's death, vision, and comeback from the dead. On June 6, 1988, the elderly Ayer swallowed a piece of fish and died. He flatlined (cardiac arrest and asystole). He was clinically dead for four minutes.
Ayer was not just any old atheist. He was one of the greatest atheists on the 20th century. "Ayer had spent most of his adult life putting the case very publicly on radio and television, as well as in print, for the “non-existence” of God—indeed arguing that the very idea of “God” was devoid of meaning, a position known in theology as igtheism. He had gone twelve rounds with the best and the brightest of the bishops and theologians in the land—and in the public mind he was thought, in the main, to have triumphed." Famously, in 1949 Ayer debated Roman Catholic philosopher F.C. Copleston.
While dead, Ayer had a vision that affected him so much he said, "My recent experiences have slightly weakened my conviction that my genuine death, which is due fairly soon, will be the end of me, though I continue to hope that it will be. They have not weakened my conviction that there is no God.” While Ayer said this publicly, privately he confided in his physician, Dr. Jeremy George, that ‘I saw a Divine Being. I’m afraid I’m going to have to revise all my various books and opinions.’
“He clearly said ‘Divine Being,’” said Dr. George. “He was confiding in me, and I think he was slightly embarrassed because it was unsettling for him as an atheist. He spoke in a very confidential manner. I think he felt he had come face to face with God, or his maker, or what one might say was God. Later, when I read his article, I was surprised to see he had left out all mention of it. I was simply amused. I wasn’t very familiar with his philosophy at the time of the incident, so the significance wasn't immediately obvious.”
After Ayer had been released from the hospital his friends and family noticed he had changed. A friend, Dee Wells, said, “He became so much nicer after he died. He was not nearly so boastful. He took an interest in other people.”
Ayer began spending much time with his old opponent F.C. Copleston. Copleston became Ayer's closest friend. They spent many hours together, "talking and arguing about who knows what."
I just read Peter Foges's "An Atheist Meets the Masters of the Universe," an essay on A.J. Ayer's death, vision, and comeback from the dead. On June 6, 1988, the elderly Ayer swallowed a piece of fish and died. He flatlined (cardiac arrest and asystole). He was clinically dead for four minutes.
Ayer was not just any old atheist. He was one of the greatest atheists on the 20th century. "Ayer had spent most of his adult life putting the case very publicly on radio and television, as well as in print, for the “non-existence” of God—indeed arguing that the very idea of “God” was devoid of meaning, a position known in theology as igtheism. He had gone twelve rounds with the best and the brightest of the bishops and theologians in the land—and in the public mind he was thought, in the main, to have triumphed." Famously, in 1949 Ayer debated Roman Catholic philosopher F.C. Copleston.
While dead, Ayer had a vision that affected him so much he said, "My recent experiences have slightly weakened my conviction that my genuine death, which is due fairly soon, will be the end of me, though I continue to hope that it will be. They have not weakened my conviction that there is no God.” While Ayer said this publicly, privately he confided in his physician, Dr. Jeremy George, that ‘I saw a Divine Being. I’m afraid I’m going to have to revise all my various books and opinions.’
“He clearly said ‘Divine Being,’” said Dr. George. “He was confiding in me, and I think he was slightly embarrassed because it was unsettling for him as an atheist. He spoke in a very confidential manner. I think he felt he had come face to face with God, or his maker, or what one might say was God. Later, when I read his article, I was surprised to see he had left out all mention of it. I was simply amused. I wasn’t very familiar with his philosophy at the time of the incident, so the significance wasn't immediately obvious.”
After Ayer had been released from the hospital his friends and family noticed he had changed. A friend, Dee Wells, said, “He became so much nicer after he died. He was not nearly so boastful. He took an interest in other people.”
Ayer began spending much time with his old opponent F.C. Copleston. Copleston became Ayer's closest friend. They spent many hours together, "talking and arguing about who knows what."
Wednesday, March 24, 2010
Why Do Bad Things Happen to Good People?
Monroe County's "Big Read" for this year focuses on Thornton Wilder's Pulitzer Prize-winning novel "The Bridge of San Luis Rey." On Thursday evening, April 22, I'll be on a panel with Terry Beamsley of the Ann Arbor Zen Buddhist Temple and Sister Marie Gabriel Hungerman (and perhaps a Muslim and Jewish panelist) discussing the problem of why bad things happen to good people, which is what "Bridge" is about. You can read about this here.
Bethel School of Supernatural Evangelism in Monroe

Tuesday, March 23, 2010
"Abba"
In Mark 14 Jesus, agonizing in the Garden of Gethsemane on the Mount of Olives, addresses the Father as "Abba." “Abba” is not “Daddy,” if that means in some childish sense. “Abba” is an intimate family word. R. T. France says it means “the respectful intimacy of a son in a patriarchal family.” (France, Mark, 584)
No Jew prior to Jesus had addressed the Father so intimately. Ben Witherington states that this implies “a filial consciousness on the part of Jesus that involved a degree of intimacy with God unlike anything we know of in Judaism prior to Jesus’ day. So far as we can tell from our limited evidence, no one had previously addressed God as abba.” (Witherington, Christology of Jesus, 220) Witherington adds: “Jesus saw himself as the unique mediator of a relationship with the Father that could express itself by using the intimate term abba.” (Ib.)
"Abba" is Trinitarian perichoretic-union language, a word of intimate union. A unitive family word. Jesus the Son is "in" the Father, and the Father is "in" him. So where does that leave us? Looking through the outside window at the family dance of the Trinity? No. Remember that, in John 14-16, Abba comes to make his home in us. In you, if you are a Jesus-lover.
This is huge. So huge that Paul writes, in Romans 8:15: "For you did not receive a spirit that makes you a slave again to fear, but you received the Spirit of sonship. And by him we cry, "Abba, Father."" R.T. France explains: “Paul introduces ‘Abba’ as the sign of an amazing and hitherto inadmissible relationship of the individual believer with God.” (France, Mark, 584)
***
I have read Amy-Jill Levine's interpretation of "Abba" in her book The Misunderstood Jew. Levine says this:
Levine thinks Jesus' use of 'Abba" "has a political edge." (Ib., 44) She writes: "The Caesars on the throne in Rome were called "Father" - as Washington was called "father of our country" or as the Russian czars by their populations (with relative degrees of warmth) "little father"... By speaking of the "Father in heaven," Jesus also insists that Rome is not the "true" father." (Ib., 44-45)
The issue, as it seems to me, is even if God is addressed in Second Temple Judaism as "Father": 1) was God addressed as 'Abba,' and if so, then 2) is 'Abba' a more intimate familial address?
No Jew prior to Jesus had addressed the Father so intimately. Ben Witherington states that this implies “a filial consciousness on the part of Jesus that involved a degree of intimacy with God unlike anything we know of in Judaism prior to Jesus’ day. So far as we can tell from our limited evidence, no one had previously addressed God as abba.” (Witherington, Christology of Jesus, 220) Witherington adds: “Jesus saw himself as the unique mediator of a relationship with the Father that could express itself by using the intimate term abba.” (Ib.)
"Abba" is Trinitarian perichoretic-union language, a word of intimate union. A unitive family word. Jesus the Son is "in" the Father, and the Father is "in" him. So where does that leave us? Looking through the outside window at the family dance of the Trinity? No. Remember that, in John 14-16, Abba comes to make his home in us. In you, if you are a Jesus-lover.
This is huge. So huge that Paul writes, in Romans 8:15: "For you did not receive a spirit that makes you a slave again to fear, but you received the Spirit of sonship. And by him we cry, "Abba, Father."" R.T. France explains: “Paul introduces ‘Abba’ as the sign of an amazing and hitherto inadmissible relationship of the individual believer with God.” (France, Mark, 584)
***
I have read Amy-Jill Levine's interpretation of "Abba" in her book The Misunderstood Jew. Levine says this:
- "Still popular is the view that only Jesus would have dared to call God 'Father' and that only Jesus would have done so with the daring use of the Aramaic term Abba, meaning 'Daddy.' The claims are hopelessly flawed." (Levine, The Misunderstood Jew, 42) How so?
- During the period of Second Temple Judaism there is an increasing use of addressing God as 'Father.' So Malachi 2:10 states, "Have we not all one father?"
- Levine says to translate Abba as "Daddy" is incorrect. "The term means 'father,' and it is not an expression associated primarily with little children." (Ib., 43) I think Levine is right on this. But Abba is still a filial term.
Levine thinks Jesus' use of 'Abba" "has a political edge." (Ib., 44) She writes: "The Caesars on the throne in Rome were called "Father" - as Washington was called "father of our country" or as the Russian czars by their populations (with relative degrees of warmth) "little father"... By speaking of the "Father in heaven," Jesus also insists that Rome is not the "true" father." (Ib., 44-45)
The issue, as it seems to me, is even if God is addressed in Second Temple Judaism as "Father": 1) was God addressed as 'Abba,' and if so, then 2) is 'Abba' a more intimate familial address?
"Furious Love" Conference at Redeemer in Monroe
Filmmaker and friend Darren Wilson has just announced: "It's official. Furious Love conference is a go, and it will be truly unique. April 6-9, 2011 in Monroe, Michigan. More details coming soon."
Josh Bentley of Redeemer is working with Darren on this. Our expectation is that many of the speakers in "Furious Love" will be at this event.
More details will be given as they unfold.
Josh Bentley of Redeemer is working with Darren on this. Our expectation is that many of the speakers in "Furious Love" will be at this event.
More details will be given as they unfold.
Redeemer Ministry School - We Mentor Students to Preach
Tomorrow morning at Redeemer two of our RMS students will preach - Joy Bergeson and Patt Busenbark.
Our RMS students and other Redeemer young adults regularly preach at our Friday evening meetings at Newport Beach Cafe - 9 PM.
Josh Bentley and I mentor our young adults and RMS students to preach. We guide them through a process of: preparing a sermon, how to study the text, how to be clear and coherent in the presentation, seeking God for what he wants to do when the word is preached, and discerning what the Spirit wants to do when the sermon is done.
Our RMS students and other Redeemer young adults regularly preach at our Friday evening meetings at Newport Beach Cafe - 9 PM.
Josh Bentley and I mentor our young adults and RMS students to preach. We guide them through a process of: preparing a sermon, how to study the text, how to be clear and coherent in the presentation, seeking God for what he wants to do when the word is preached, and discerning what the Spirit wants to do when the sermon is done.
Monday, March 22, 2010
Redeemer Ministry School - Historical Survey of the Moves of God
(Azuza Street Mission)
Tomorrow the third trimester of Redeemer Ministry School begins with my colleague Josh Bentley teaching his class:
Kingdom of God III - Historical Survey of The Moves of God
Description: This course will survey the way that The Kingdom of God has advanced historically from the Acts of the Apostles until today. There will be great attention paid to the origins, characteristics, and demises of each move of God. Meets Tuesday/Thursday; 9:30am - 11:00am
Personally, I don't know someone who knows more about this subject, studies it as hard, and is so passionate about it. All students taking Josh's class will be privileged to learn under someone who is a growing scholar in this area.
Tomorrow the third trimester of Redeemer Ministry School begins with my colleague Josh Bentley teaching his class:
Kingdom of God III - Historical Survey of The Moves of God
Description: This course will survey the way that The Kingdom of God has advanced historically from the Acts of the Apostles until today. There will be great attention paid to the origins, characteristics, and demises of each move of God. Meets Tuesday/Thursday; 9:30am - 11:00am
Personally, I don't know someone who knows more about this subject, studies it as hard, and is so passionate about it. All students taking Josh's class will be privileged to learn under someone who is a growing scholar in this area.
C.S. Lewis on Pride
C.S. Lewis writes:
"The Christians are right: it is Pride which has been the chief cause of misery in every nation and every family since the world began. Other vices may sometimes bring people together: you may find good fellowship and jokes and friendliness among drunken people or unchaste people. But pride always means enmity - it is enmity. And not only enmity between man and man, but enmity to God.
In God you come up against something which is in every respect immeasurably superior to yourself. Unless you know God as that - and, therefore, know yourself as nothing in comparison - you do not know God at all. As long as you are proud you cannot know God. A proud man is always looking down on things and people: and, of course, as long as you are looking down, you cannot see something that is above you."
James 4:6 says - "God is opposed to the proud, but gives grace to the humble."
Francis Frangipane has called pride "the armor of darkness."
Pride keeps, by an act of self-will, God out, and self in.
Lewis calls pride "the complete anti-God state of mind." "Pride is spiritual cancer: it eats up the very possibility of love, or contentment, or even common sense."
"Pride," on the surface, seems cool, like something one would want to have, since it declares "I am better than other people!" But to want this is like saying "I want to have cancer inside of me." Pride is corrosive. Pride eats away. Pride alienates. Pride is always the teacher, since, essentially, pride cannot learn because it is convinced that it is the fountain of all learning.
The proud person is a person in bondage who cannot see their own prison walls. To rescue a proud person one must engage in the prison ministry of humility. When humility meets pride, freedom meets bondage.
Nietzsche despised the kind of things I am saying. He did not understand the strength and power of humility. "Christ humbled himself, taking on the form of a servant." (Phil. 2)
Lewis concludes: "If anyone would like to acquire humility, I can, I think, tell him the first step. The first step is to realise that one is proud. And a biggish step, too. At least, nothing whatever can be done before it. If you think you are not conceited, it means you are very conceited indeed."
"The Christians are right: it is Pride which has been the chief cause of misery in every nation and every family since the world began. Other vices may sometimes bring people together: you may find good fellowship and jokes and friendliness among drunken people or unchaste people. But pride always means enmity - it is enmity. And not only enmity between man and man, but enmity to God.
In God you come up against something which is in every respect immeasurably superior to yourself. Unless you know God as that - and, therefore, know yourself as nothing in comparison - you do not know God at all. As long as you are proud you cannot know God. A proud man is always looking down on things and people: and, of course, as long as you are looking down, you cannot see something that is above you."
James 4:6 says - "God is opposed to the proud, but gives grace to the humble."
Francis Frangipane has called pride "the armor of darkness."
Pride keeps, by an act of self-will, God out, and self in.
Lewis calls pride "the complete anti-God state of mind." "Pride is spiritual cancer: it eats up the very possibility of love, or contentment, or even common sense."
"Pride," on the surface, seems cool, like something one would want to have, since it declares "I am better than other people!" But to want this is like saying "I want to have cancer inside of me." Pride is corrosive. Pride eats away. Pride alienates. Pride is always the teacher, since, essentially, pride cannot learn because it is convinced that it is the fountain of all learning.
The proud person is a person in bondage who cannot see their own prison walls. To rescue a proud person one must engage in the prison ministry of humility. When humility meets pride, freedom meets bondage.
Nietzsche despised the kind of things I am saying. He did not understand the strength and power of humility. "Christ humbled himself, taking on the form of a servant." (Phil. 2)
Lewis concludes: "If anyone would like to acquire humility, I can, I think, tell him the first step. The first step is to realise that one is proud. And a biggish step, too. At least, nothing whatever can be done before it. If you think you are not conceited, it means you are very conceited indeed."
Sunday, March 21, 2010
Preachers Who Don't Believe In God
(Linda and I with some of my Faith Bible Seminary students in NYC.)
Daniel Dennett and Linda LaScola have published a study called “Preachers Who Are Not Believers.” It's done in the name of The Center for Cognitive Studies at Tufts University. There’s a dialogue re. their study at washingtonpost.com’s “On Faith.”
I read the document today and have some thoughts.
1. The burning question is: “Are there clergy who don’t believe in God?” Without seeing the study, my answer would be “yes.” Of course. “With the help of a grant from a small foundation, administered through Tufts University, we set out to find some closeted nonbelievers who would agree to be intensively --and, of course, confidentially–interviewed.” (1)
2. Dennett and LaScola (D&S) are both atheists. Will this skew their research? Possibly. But since we all interpret out of a “grand narrative,” there’s no intrinsic reason to protest. Theists can study ex-atheists, so atheists can also study ex-theists.
3. D&S call this a “pilot study.” Which means it functions as a prototype for more studies. “For this pilot study we managed to identify five brave pastors, all still actively engaged with parishes, who were prepared to trust us with their stories. All five are Protestants, with master’s level seminary education. Three represented liberal denominations (the liberals) and two came from more conservative, evangelical traditions (the literals).”
4. The five pastors all think there are more clergy-closet-unbelievers. But, admittedly, they can’t verify this. D&S think there are more. I say, of course there are. How many more? We don’t know. My guess is that it would be a small percentage. One reason is this. For the past 30 years I have functioned as a spiritual coach/director for 800+ clergy. They have been from every part of the world, all over the U.S., male and female, old and young. I have given them assignments re. prayer, meditation, and journal-keeping. They have submitted their journals to me. While I allow them to edit the journals, 99% have chosen not to edit them. The coaching period has been, minimally, six weeks, and in a few occasions a year or more. Most of my coaches have been in my spiritual transformation courses taught at four theological seminaries (one of which is a Chinese seminary). Two of the four seminaries are multi-racial, multi-ethnic evangelical Protestant, one is Chinese, the other African-American. The journals have been a window into the hearts of church leaders. One result of my spiritual mentoring experience has been to boil down the inner struggle into a number of what I call “ontological dichotomies.” While I have at times seen various kinds of doubts in the journals, I have hardly ever (if ever) seen unbelief. Not even between the lines. I’ll add that I think I have a nose for that kind of thing.
5. Throughout the document D&S make several judgments that I find questionable. Because I work closely with seminaries (as, e.g., I am currently Project Director for the Doctor of Ministry Program at Palmer Theological Seminary), I find D&L narrow. For example, they write that the five interviewees and other potential interviewees seemed, generally, confused about the definition of “believer.” D&S write: “Are they perhaps deceiving themselves? There is no way of answering, and this is no accident. The ambiguity about who is a believer and who a nonbeliever follows inexorably from the pluralism that has been assiduously fostered by many religious leaders for a century and more: God is many different things to different people, and since we can’t know if one of these conceptions is the right one, we should honor them all. This counsel of tolerance creates a gentle fog that shrouds the question of belief in God in so much indeterminacy that if asked whether they believed in God, many people could sincerely say that they don’t know what they are being asked.” I don’t doubt that D&S discovered some who could not tell the difference. And yes, a number of religious leaders have fostered pluralism. And yes, there are a number of religious leaders who do not foster pluralism. Remember that “mainline churches” are, mainly, pluralism-fostering environments. (But we must be cautious here as, e.g., Lutherans are so diverse – they all have their own seminaries, some of which do not foster pluralism.) Non-mainline churches do not turn on the fog machine “that shrouds the question of belief in God.” See hear, e.g., USC sociologist of religion professor Donald E. Miller’s Global Pentecostalism. Also Penn State professor Philip Jenkins' The Next Christendom: The Coming of Global Christianity. In short, I agree that there is a “fog” out there in some theological institutions. But that fog does not linger over evangelicalism and global Pentecostalism. I see the absence of this fog in the spiritual journals that are sent to me, and the many other theological contexts I teach and minister in. I do, however, think D&L identify the fogginess of what has been called “liberal” Christianity. I think it would be good for mainline seminaries to pay attention to the non-directed nature of what they do and the existential wilderness they leave some of their students in. To me, as I now think of this, I am reminded of a generation of parents who raised their children to “make their own decisions” while all the time these children needed some mentors, in a more directed way.
6. Some of D&L’s conclusions of this small pilot study are:
a. “The loneliness of non-believing pastors is extreme.” I’ll qualify this to say: The loneliness of five non-believing pastors is extreme. It may be that the loneliness of most or all is this way. I wouldn’t be surprised to find out that it was so. I suspect the loneliness factor will be a function of the particular theological environment they serve in.
b. There is a “gulf… between what one says from the pulpit and what one has been taught in seminary.” OK. Sometimes the gulf is an intellectual one. While I was in seminary I took some independent studies; e.g. one on a reading of Heidegger’s Being and Time, one on a reading of Gadamer’s truth and method, and one on the “problem of religious language.” To this day I never mention “Heidegger” from the pulpit, yet I continue to read, on occasion, Heidegger. But D&L specifically mention the seminarian’s studies on textual-critical issues. Some seminarians, a few at least, freak out over these things. Others, like myself, continue them to this day. Many of us have not become “Bart Ehrman’s.” That’s our testimony. And of course Bart has his. What’s the difference between a “Bart Ehrman” and a “Craig Keener?” Both are brilliant. Some have made guesses as to the difference. No ad hominems allowed, please.
c. D&L talk about the responses of people when an unbelieving clergy-person comes out of the closet. They liken this to Mother Teresa. D&L write: “And of course Mother Theresa encountered the same response from those to whom she confided her loss of faith. Nobody in any church wants to learn that a person of God has lost their belief in God.” But Mother Teresa did not lose her faith. I’ve read her journals. Having read hundreds of journals over the past 30 years, I suspect that anyone who thinks, on reading Mother Teresa’s journals, that she became an unbeliever, have themselves never read a spiritual journal in their life.
d. D&L describe the five nonbelieving clergy as “brave individuals who are still trying to figure out how to live with the decisions they made many years ago, when they decided, full of devotion and hope, to give their lives to a God they no longer find by their sides.” Probably it does take courage to admit you have committed to a “profession” the heart of which is belief in God, and now you no longer believe in God. Had this happened to me, I would have to resign from my congregation, since it is a group of passionate God-believers. It would be unethical for me to stay as their “pastor” and, when one of them asks me about “heaven” I become “very good at holding my tongue” (as one of the interviewees said). One interviewee, Jack, says things like “Well, that’s very nice of you to say that,” as the young widow says she believes her husband is in heaven. “Wes,” an unbelieving pastor, says: “I don’t feel like a hypocrite. I feel very authentic and very credible when I say things to my people. . .” As I read this I feel the fog settling in, the thick obscuring cloud that blurs the distinction between hypocrisy and authenticity.
D&L’s document is 28 pages long, with moments of helpful insight and some stretches of fog.
Daniel Dennett and Linda LaScola have published a study called “Preachers Who Are Not Believers.” It's done in the name of The Center for Cognitive Studies at Tufts University. There’s a dialogue re. their study at washingtonpost.com’s “On Faith.”
I read the document today and have some thoughts.
1. The burning question is: “Are there clergy who don’t believe in God?” Without seeing the study, my answer would be “yes.” Of course. “With the help of a grant from a small foundation, administered through Tufts University, we set out to find some closeted nonbelievers who would agree to be intensively --and, of course, confidentially–interviewed.” (1)
2. Dennett and LaScola (D&S) are both atheists. Will this skew their research? Possibly. But since we all interpret out of a “grand narrative,” there’s no intrinsic reason to protest. Theists can study ex-atheists, so atheists can also study ex-theists.
3. D&S call this a “pilot study.” Which means it functions as a prototype for more studies. “For this pilot study we managed to identify five brave pastors, all still actively engaged with parishes, who were prepared to trust us with their stories. All five are Protestants, with master’s level seminary education. Three represented liberal denominations (the liberals) and two came from more conservative, evangelical traditions (the literals).”
4. The five pastors all think there are more clergy-closet-unbelievers. But, admittedly, they can’t verify this. D&S think there are more. I say, of course there are. How many more? We don’t know. My guess is that it would be a small percentage. One reason is this. For the past 30 years I have functioned as a spiritual coach/director for 800+ clergy. They have been from every part of the world, all over the U.S., male and female, old and young. I have given them assignments re. prayer, meditation, and journal-keeping. They have submitted their journals to me. While I allow them to edit the journals, 99% have chosen not to edit them. The coaching period has been, minimally, six weeks, and in a few occasions a year or more. Most of my coaches have been in my spiritual transformation courses taught at four theological seminaries (one of which is a Chinese seminary). Two of the four seminaries are multi-racial, multi-ethnic evangelical Protestant, one is Chinese, the other African-American. The journals have been a window into the hearts of church leaders. One result of my spiritual mentoring experience has been to boil down the inner struggle into a number of what I call “ontological dichotomies.” While I have at times seen various kinds of doubts in the journals, I have hardly ever (if ever) seen unbelief. Not even between the lines. I’ll add that I think I have a nose for that kind of thing.
5. Throughout the document D&S make several judgments that I find questionable. Because I work closely with seminaries (as, e.g., I am currently Project Director for the Doctor of Ministry Program at Palmer Theological Seminary), I find D&L narrow. For example, they write that the five interviewees and other potential interviewees seemed, generally, confused about the definition of “believer.” D&S write: “Are they perhaps deceiving themselves? There is no way of answering, and this is no accident. The ambiguity about who is a believer and who a nonbeliever follows inexorably from the pluralism that has been assiduously fostered by many religious leaders for a century and more: God is many different things to different people, and since we can’t know if one of these conceptions is the right one, we should honor them all. This counsel of tolerance creates a gentle fog that shrouds the question of belief in God in so much indeterminacy that if asked whether they believed in God, many people could sincerely say that they don’t know what they are being asked.” I don’t doubt that D&S discovered some who could not tell the difference. And yes, a number of religious leaders have fostered pluralism. And yes, there are a number of religious leaders who do not foster pluralism. Remember that “mainline churches” are, mainly, pluralism-fostering environments. (But we must be cautious here as, e.g., Lutherans are so diverse – they all have their own seminaries, some of which do not foster pluralism.) Non-mainline churches do not turn on the fog machine “that shrouds the question of belief in God.” See hear, e.g., USC sociologist of religion professor Donald E. Miller’s Global Pentecostalism. Also Penn State professor Philip Jenkins' The Next Christendom: The Coming of Global Christianity. In short, I agree that there is a “fog” out there in some theological institutions. But that fog does not linger over evangelicalism and global Pentecostalism. I see the absence of this fog in the spiritual journals that are sent to me, and the many other theological contexts I teach and minister in. I do, however, think D&L identify the fogginess of what has been called “liberal” Christianity. I think it would be good for mainline seminaries to pay attention to the non-directed nature of what they do and the existential wilderness they leave some of their students in. To me, as I now think of this, I am reminded of a generation of parents who raised their children to “make their own decisions” while all the time these children needed some mentors, in a more directed way.
6. Some of D&L’s conclusions of this small pilot study are:
a. “The loneliness of non-believing pastors is extreme.” I’ll qualify this to say: The loneliness of five non-believing pastors is extreme. It may be that the loneliness of most or all is this way. I wouldn’t be surprised to find out that it was so. I suspect the loneliness factor will be a function of the particular theological environment they serve in.
b. There is a “gulf… between what one says from the pulpit and what one has been taught in seminary.” OK. Sometimes the gulf is an intellectual one. While I was in seminary I took some independent studies; e.g. one on a reading of Heidegger’s Being and Time, one on a reading of Gadamer’s truth and method, and one on the “problem of religious language.” To this day I never mention “Heidegger” from the pulpit, yet I continue to read, on occasion, Heidegger. But D&L specifically mention the seminarian’s studies on textual-critical issues. Some seminarians, a few at least, freak out over these things. Others, like myself, continue them to this day. Many of us have not become “Bart Ehrman’s.” That’s our testimony. And of course Bart has his. What’s the difference between a “Bart Ehrman” and a “Craig Keener?” Both are brilliant. Some have made guesses as to the difference. No ad hominems allowed, please.
c. D&L talk about the responses of people when an unbelieving clergy-person comes out of the closet. They liken this to Mother Teresa. D&L write: “And of course Mother Theresa encountered the same response from those to whom she confided her loss of faith. Nobody in any church wants to learn that a person of God has lost their belief in God.” But Mother Teresa did not lose her faith. I’ve read her journals. Having read hundreds of journals over the past 30 years, I suspect that anyone who thinks, on reading Mother Teresa’s journals, that she became an unbeliever, have themselves never read a spiritual journal in their life.
d. D&L describe the five nonbelieving clergy as “brave individuals who are still trying to figure out how to live with the decisions they made many years ago, when they decided, full of devotion and hope, to give their lives to a God they no longer find by their sides.” Probably it does take courage to admit you have committed to a “profession” the heart of which is belief in God, and now you no longer believe in God. Had this happened to me, I would have to resign from my congregation, since it is a group of passionate God-believers. It would be unethical for me to stay as their “pastor” and, when one of them asks me about “heaven” I become “very good at holding my tongue” (as one of the interviewees said). One interviewee, Jack, says things like “Well, that’s very nice of you to say that,” as the young widow says she believes her husband is in heaven. “Wes,” an unbelieving pastor, says: “I don’t feel like a hypocrite. I feel very authentic and very credible when I say things to my people. . .” As I read this I feel the fog settling in, the thick obscuring cloud that blurs the distinction between hypocrisy and authenticity.
D&L’s document is 28 pages long, with moments of helpful insight and some stretches of fog.
Saturday, March 20, 2010
David Berlinski, Evil & Religion, and Pinker's "Shockingly Happy Picture"
I just got David Berlinski's The Devil's Disciple: Atheism and Its Scientific Pretensions. What is unique about Berlinski is his non-religious nature, railing against the new atheists. He writes: "I am a secular Jew. My religious education did not take... I cannot pray. I have spent more years than I care to remember in studying mathematics and writing about the sciences. Yet the book that follows is in some sense a defense of religious thought and sentiment. Biblical verses are the least of it." (xiii)
Berlinski is witty, caustic, funny, and brilliant. One of the thngs he addresses is the atheistic idea that religion is, especially, the root of all evil. He quotes physicist Steven Weinberg, famously, as saying: "Religion is an insult to human dignity. With or without it you would have good people doing good things and evil people doing evil things. But for good people to do evil things, that takes religion." (21)
I now confess: "religion" has made me a far better person than I was without it. And, I have met countless people over the years about whom I could say the same. But onwards...
Berlinski turns to atheist Steven Pinker, who believes that "something in modernity and its cultural institutions has made us nobler." Pinker gives us good news: "In the scale of decades, comprehensive daya again paint a shockingly happy picture. Some of the evidence has been under our nose all along. Conventional history has long shown that, in many ways, we have been getting kinder and gentler." (21-22) Pinker gos on to list things like "cruelty as entertainment, human sacrifice to indulge superstition, slavery as a labor-saving device, genocide..., torture and mutilation..., assassination..., rape..., homicide... - "all were unexceptionable features of life for most of human history. But, today, they are are to nonexistent in the West." (22)
To which Berlinski responds, surely Pinker jests! Here is Berlinski's list of 20th century "happy-face moments."
A Shockingly Happy Picture by Excess Deaths (22-24)
And, we have the following "awkward fact": "The twentieth century was not an age of faith, and it was awful. Lenin, Stalin, Hitler, Mao, and Pol Pot will never be counted among the religious leaders of mankind." (19)
Berlinski is witty, caustic, funny, and brilliant. One of the thngs he addresses is the atheistic idea that religion is, especially, the root of all evil. He quotes physicist Steven Weinberg, famously, as saying: "Religion is an insult to human dignity. With or without it you would have good people doing good things and evil people doing evil things. But for good people to do evil things, that takes religion." (21)
I now confess: "religion" has made me a far better person than I was without it. And, I have met countless people over the years about whom I could say the same. But onwards...
Berlinski turns to atheist Steven Pinker, who believes that "something in modernity and its cultural institutions has made us nobler." Pinker gives us good news: "In the scale of decades, comprehensive daya again paint a shockingly happy picture. Some of the evidence has been under our nose all along. Conventional history has long shown that, in many ways, we have been getting kinder and gentler." (21-22) Pinker gos on to list things like "cruelty as entertainment, human sacrifice to indulge superstition, slavery as a labor-saving device, genocide..., torture and mutilation..., assassination..., rape..., homicide... - "all were unexceptionable features of life for most of human history. But, today, they are are to nonexistent in the West." (22)
To which Berlinski responds, surely Pinker jests! Here is Berlinski's list of 20th century "happy-face moments."
A Shockingly Happy Picture by Excess Deaths (22-24)
- First World War(1914-18): ……..................................................15 million
- Russian Civil War(1917-22) ……..................................................9 million
- Soviet Union,Stalin's Regime(1924-53) ……...............................20 million
- Second World War(1937-45) ……..............................................55 million
- Chinese Civil War(1945-49) ……..................................................2.5 million
- People's Republic of China,Mao Zedong's regime(1949-75) …….40 million
- Tibet(1950 et seq.) ……...................................................................600,000
- Congo Free State(1886-1908) …….................................................8 million
- Mexico(1910-20) ……....................................................................1 million
- Turkish Massacres of Armenians(1915-23) ……............................1.5 million
- China(1917-28) ……........................................................................800,000
- China,Nationalist Era(1928-37) ……..............................................3.1 million
- Korean War(1950-53) ……............................................................2.8 million
- North Korea(1948 et seq.) ……......................................................2 million
- Rwanda and Burundi(1959-95) ……..............................................1.35 million
- Second Indochina War(1960-75) ……............................................3.5 million
- Ethopia(1962-92) ……......................................................................400,000
- Nigeria(1966-70) ……....................................................................1 million
- Bangladesh(1971) ……..................................................................1.25 million
- Cambodia,Khmer Rouge(1975-78) ……........................................1.65
- Mozambique(1975-92) …….......................................................... 1 million
- Afghanistan(1979-2001) ……........................................................1.8 million
- Iran Iraq War(1980-88) …….........................................................1 million
- Sudan(1983 et seq.) ……..............................................................1.9 million
- Kinshasa,Congo(1998 et seq.) ……...............................................3.8 million
- Phillipines Insurgency(1899-1902) ……...........................................220,000
- Brazil(1900 et seq.) ……..................................................................500,000
- Amazonia(1900-1912) ……..............................................................250,000
- Portuguese Colonies(1900-1925) ……..............................................325,000
- French Colonies(1900-1940) ……....................................................200,000
- Japanese War(1904-5) ……..............................................................130,000
- German East Africa(1905-7) …….....................................................175,000
- Libya(1911-31) …….........................................................................125,000
- Balkan Wars(1912-13) ……..............................................................140,000
- Greco-Turkish War(1919-22) ……...................................................250,000
- Spanish Civil War(1936-39) …….....................................................365,000
- Franco Regime(1939-75) ……..........................................................100,000
- Abyssinian Conquest(1935-41) …….................................................400,000
- Finnish War(1939-40) ……..............................................................150,000
- Greek Civil War(1943-49) ……........................................................158,000
- Yugoslavia,Tito's Regime(1944-80) ……..........................................200,000
- First Indochina War(1945-54) …......................................................400,000
- Colombia(1946-58) ……..................................................................200,000
- India(1947) ……..............................................................................500,000
- Romania(1948-89) ……...................................................................150,000
- Burma/Myanmar(1948 et seq.) …….................................................130,000
- Algeria(1954-62) ……......................................................................537,000
- Sudan(1955-72) …….......................................................................500,000
- Guatemala(1960-96) …….................................................................200,000
- Indonesia(1965-66) ……..................................................................400,000
- Ugandi, Idi Amin's Regime(1972-79) ...…........................................300,000
- Vietnam, postwar Communist Regime(1975 et seq.) ……................430,000
- Angola(1975-2002) ……..................................................................550,000
- East Timor, conquest by Indonesia(1975-99) ……...........................200,000
- Lebanon(1975-90) ……...................................................................150,000
- Cambodian Civil War(1978-91) ……...............................................225,000
- Iraq, Saddam Hussein(1979-2003) ……...........................................300,000
- Uganda(1979-86) …….....................................................................300,000
- Kurdistan(1980's,1990's) ……..........................................................300,000
- Liberia(1989-97) ……......................................................................150,000
- Iraq(1990- ) ……..............................................................................350,000
- Bosnia and Herzegovina(1992-95) ……............................................175,000
- Somalia(1991 et seq.) ……...............................................................400,000
And, we have the following "awkward fact": "The twentieth century was not an age of faith, and it was awful. Lenin, Stalin, Hitler, Mao, and Pol Pot will never be counted among the religious leaders of mankind." (19)
Nagel on the Self-contradictoriness & Vacuity of Relativism
NYU Professor of Philosophy & Professor of LawThomas Nagel writes:
"Many forms of relativism and subjectivism collapse into either self-contradiction or vacuity - self-contradiction because they end up claiming that nothing is the case, or vacuity because they boil down to the assertion that anything we say or believe is something we say or believe. I think that all general and most restricted forms of subjectivism that do not fail in either of these ways are pretty clearly false. It is usually a good strategy to ask whether a general claim about truth or meaning applies to itself. Many theories, like logical positivism, can be eliminated immediately by this test. The familiar point that relativism is self-refuting remains valid in spite of its familiarity: We cannot criticize some of our own claims of reason without employing reason at some other point to formulate and support those criticisms."
For those unfamiliar with "logical positivism," it is a philosophical position of the early-to-mid twentieth century that claimed setences were cognitively meaningless unless empirically verifiable or tautological (analytic staements, such as defintions, where the predicate is contained analytically in the subject). But by its own principle of verification the "verification principle" of logical positivism itself was cognitively meaningless, and therefore obviousyl self-contradictory. It was eventually rejected by Wittgenstein who had esposed it in his earleir work Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus.
"Many forms of relativism and subjectivism collapse into either self-contradiction or vacuity - self-contradiction because they end up claiming that nothing is the case, or vacuity because they boil down to the assertion that anything we say or believe is something we say or believe. I think that all general and most restricted forms of subjectivism that do not fail in either of these ways are pretty clearly false. It is usually a good strategy to ask whether a general claim about truth or meaning applies to itself. Many theories, like logical positivism, can be eliminated immediately by this test. The familiar point that relativism is self-refuting remains valid in spite of its familiarity: We cannot criticize some of our own claims of reason without employing reason at some other point to formulate and support those criticisms."
For those unfamiliar with "logical positivism," it is a philosophical position of the early-to-mid twentieth century that claimed setences were cognitively meaningless unless empirically verifiable or tautological (analytic staements, such as defintions, where the predicate is contained analytically in the subject). But by its own principle of verification the "verification principle" of logical positivism itself was cognitively meaningless, and therefore obviousyl self-contradictory. It was eventually rejected by Wittgenstein who had esposed it in his earleir work Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus.
Friday, March 19, 2010
An Evening of Prophetic, Redemptive Activity
If you are one of Jesus' followers who is in need of strength, comfort, or encouragement from God, then I invite you to join me tomorrow evening, March 20, 6-8 PM, in our church's sanctuary. We are going to worship, pray, and invite the Holy Spirit to minister to us.
A few months ago, during one of my extended prayer times, I heard God speak to me about this: set apart March 20 (our normal Worship Intercession Night [WIN]) for an evening of worship and welcoming the prophetic.
Biblically ths is on target since we are to welcome prophetic activity. In the Old Testament God spoke through prophets. In the New Testament God gives his called-out people the spiritual gift of prophecy. We are told, in 1 Corinthians 14:1, that we are to desire spiritual gifts, and especially that we might prophesy. Why? Because, as Paul goes on to say in 1 Cor. 14:3 - through prophecy God can speak so as to strengthen, encourage, and comfort his people.
Last spring I had another one of those moments where a scripture that I had read many times became highlighted for me. It was 1 Cor. 14:1-3. At that moment my desire to prophesy increased. Here is how I now understand this.
Linda and I, every week, every day, help people who are struggling. We love doing this. Over the years we have seen many successes. These moments become the best moments of our lives. For us it doesn't get any better than to engage in redemptive activity. It has also happened, many times, that God has given us just the right words to say that do a redeeming work in the person we are helping. And, we've had our moments of felt incapacity and inability. Even now we have friends that we love who are in deep struggles, and lack the words and ideas that would set them free. So - God, can you help us?
At this point the gift of prophecy becomes sought-after. I want this gift, operating in my life, now more than ever. I do not want it to be some "prophet." I do want it because I long to see greater redemptive activity in the lives of people I care for and love. Surely God has the keys to a person's suffering heart. Surely God knows the way out of bondage and darkness. What if, instead of just using our intellects, God, out of his all-knowingness, revealed words that functioned as agents of freedom and hope? That, for me, is 1 Corinthians 14-type "prophesy." Who wouldn't want something like that?
I have a sense of expectation about tomorrow evening. It's been placed in my heart, by God. If either you or someone you know needs a word from God, I invite you to join me.
A few months ago, during one of my extended prayer times, I heard God speak to me about this: set apart March 20 (our normal Worship Intercession Night [WIN]) for an evening of worship and welcoming the prophetic.
Biblically ths is on target since we are to welcome prophetic activity. In the Old Testament God spoke through prophets. In the New Testament God gives his called-out people the spiritual gift of prophecy. We are told, in 1 Corinthians 14:1, that we are to desire spiritual gifts, and especially that we might prophesy. Why? Because, as Paul goes on to say in 1 Cor. 14:3 - through prophecy God can speak so as to strengthen, encourage, and comfort his people.
Last spring I had another one of those moments where a scripture that I had read many times became highlighted for me. It was 1 Cor. 14:1-3. At that moment my desire to prophesy increased. Here is how I now understand this.
Linda and I, every week, every day, help people who are struggling. We love doing this. Over the years we have seen many successes. These moments become the best moments of our lives. For us it doesn't get any better than to engage in redemptive activity. It has also happened, many times, that God has given us just the right words to say that do a redeeming work in the person we are helping. And, we've had our moments of felt incapacity and inability. Even now we have friends that we love who are in deep struggles, and lack the words and ideas that would set them free. So - God, can you help us?
At this point the gift of prophecy becomes sought-after. I want this gift, operating in my life, now more than ever. I do not want it to be some "prophet." I do want it because I long to see greater redemptive activity in the lives of people I care for and love. Surely God has the keys to a person's suffering heart. Surely God knows the way out of bondage and darkness. What if, instead of just using our intellects, God, out of his all-knowingness, revealed words that functioned as agents of freedom and hope? That, for me, is 1 Corinthians 14-type "prophesy." Who wouldn't want something like that?
I have a sense of expectation about tomorrow evening. It's been placed in my heart, by God. If either you or someone you know needs a word from God, I invite you to join me.
Is Paul Copan A Moral Relativist?
Hector Avalos recently pointed me here in response to my post on Paul Copan’s essay "Are Old Testament Laws Evil?" One of Hector’s claims is that Copan’s position is itself an example of moral relativism.
Avalos says: “As an atheist, I don’t deny that I am a moral relativist. Rather, my aim is to expose the fact that Christians are also moral relativists. Indeed, when it comes to ethics, there are only two types of people in this world:
A. Those who admit they are moral relativists;
B. Those who do not admit they are moral relativists.”
Now that... is an astounding claim. All persons are moral relativists? Can he be serious? Plato was a moral relativist? I don’t think so. At least it is phenomenally unhelpful and misleading to claim this. Avalos reduces all philosophical ethics courses to one note. Call it: Varieties of Moral Relativism.
My son is currently taking an ethics course at his university. I am now holding the text in my hand. It’s Contemporary Moral Problems, by James E. White. Chapter One is called: “Ethical Theories.” This chapter has ten essays, all primary source materials. One of the ten (not all) is called “Ethical Relativism,” by William H. Shaw. Apparently, on Avalos’s theory, the other nine should be titled the same.
Shaw writes: “ethical relativism is the normative theory that what is right is what the culture says is right. What is right in one place may be wrong in another, because the only criterion for distinguishing right from wrong – the only ethical standard for judging an action – is the moral system of the society in which it occurs.” (White, 35)
OK. Well-said. But Plato did not believe that, as every philosophy student knows. So, Plato was not an ethical relativist. Neither Plato nor Platonists (like C.S. Lewis, e.g.) hold to the theory of ethical relativism.
Should Avalos write a book called “Everyone Is Really an Ethical Relativist” I suggest it will not be taken seriously by most philosophers. Some, however, might take it seriously. They would be, of course, ethical relativists who know they are ethical relativists (as opposed to lying ethical relativists which, it seems, is no crime on ethical relativism). Like Avalos, who confesses to hold to ethical relativism. He seems like the man whose only tool is a hammer and sees every problem as a nail. I am guessing that he sees ethical relativism in everything. It’s not. But it leads to a lot of question-begging.
Avalos writes: “Dr. Copan fails because he cannot admit that he is a moral relativist.” The reason Copan doesn’t admit to it is because he’s not. Copan is an ethical objectivist. (See Copan, "A Moral Argument," in To Everyone An Answer, in Beckwith, Craig, and Moreland)
Perhaps Avalos says what he says because he thinks Copan should be a moral relativist. Perhaps Copan’s reasoning wanders away from ethical objectivism into ethical relativism? Maybe Copan sounds, at times, more like an ethical relativist than an ethical objectivist? Maybe Avalos hears Copan that way? Is Copan saying he’s an ethical objectivist but he’s really inconsistent? When I read him it does not appear that way to me. But even if Copan is inconsistent I don’t see that he should admit he’s an ethical relativist. Inconsistency is transgression from one’s thought-out position. Probably, it happens to everyone. I know as I read some atheists I find them sounding like ethical objectivists, like the atheists Nietzsche’s madman encountered in the “village.”
Avalos, as an atheist, is committed to ethical relativism. I agree that, if atheism is true, then moral values are only subjective, and ethical relativism logically follows from this. But Avalos begs the question by saying Copan cannot admit he’s an ethical relativist precisely because Copan is a theist. This is what I think is going on here. As someone who believes the statement "God exists" is false, Avalos is thereby committed to ethical relativism. If it is false that God exists, then there are no objective moral values, even if people like Paul Copan think there are. But Copan, and I, think it is true that God exists. Therefore ethical relativism is false, and ethical objectivism is true. When Avalos, operating out of his noetic framework, calls everyone an ethical relativist, it's like a theist who tells Avalos he really believes in God even thought the atheist protests. I don't see that following that path of reasoning will get us anywhere. Because it begs the question.
Perhaps, when Avalos says all persons are really ethical relativists, he is making some kind of inside joke that I don’t get. It’s happened to me before. If that’s the case then those who get the joke are having a very good time at my expense. If it’s not a joke and Avalos is serious, then I think the joke is on him, since he seems to think that the set of "closet relativists" includes everyone from Plato to Kant to divine command theorists to even atheists who hold that there are objective moral values. If Avalos were right a lot of things would need to change in the area of philosophy of ethics. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy essay on “Moral Relativism” itself would have to be rewritten, since it assumes some philosophers (like, e.g., Martha Nussbaum) has “objectivist credentials.” I'll have to go back to a lot of my former philosophy professors and accuse them of lying as they refused to admit that they, too, were really moral relativists disguised as Kantians, Platonists, Aristotelians, etc.
Avalos says: “As an atheist, I don’t deny that I am a moral relativist. Rather, my aim is to expose the fact that Christians are also moral relativists. Indeed, when it comes to ethics, there are only two types of people in this world:
A. Those who admit they are moral relativists;
B. Those who do not admit they are moral relativists.”
Now that... is an astounding claim. All persons are moral relativists? Can he be serious? Plato was a moral relativist? I don’t think so. At least it is phenomenally unhelpful and misleading to claim this. Avalos reduces all philosophical ethics courses to one note. Call it: Varieties of Moral Relativism.
My son is currently taking an ethics course at his university. I am now holding the text in my hand. It’s Contemporary Moral Problems, by James E. White. Chapter One is called: “Ethical Theories.” This chapter has ten essays, all primary source materials. One of the ten (not all) is called “Ethical Relativism,” by William H. Shaw. Apparently, on Avalos’s theory, the other nine should be titled the same.
Shaw writes: “ethical relativism is the normative theory that what is right is what the culture says is right. What is right in one place may be wrong in another, because the only criterion for distinguishing right from wrong – the only ethical standard for judging an action – is the moral system of the society in which it occurs.” (White, 35)
OK. Well-said. But Plato did not believe that, as every philosophy student knows. So, Plato was not an ethical relativist. Neither Plato nor Platonists (like C.S. Lewis, e.g.) hold to the theory of ethical relativism.
Should Avalos write a book called “Everyone Is Really an Ethical Relativist” I suggest it will not be taken seriously by most philosophers. Some, however, might take it seriously. They would be, of course, ethical relativists who know they are ethical relativists (as opposed to lying ethical relativists which, it seems, is no crime on ethical relativism). Like Avalos, who confesses to hold to ethical relativism. He seems like the man whose only tool is a hammer and sees every problem as a nail. I am guessing that he sees ethical relativism in everything. It’s not. But it leads to a lot of question-begging.
Avalos writes: “Dr. Copan fails because he cannot admit that he is a moral relativist.” The reason Copan doesn’t admit to it is because he’s not. Copan is an ethical objectivist. (See Copan, "A Moral Argument," in To Everyone An Answer, in Beckwith, Craig, and Moreland)
Perhaps Avalos says what he says because he thinks Copan should be a moral relativist. Perhaps Copan’s reasoning wanders away from ethical objectivism into ethical relativism? Maybe Copan sounds, at times, more like an ethical relativist than an ethical objectivist? Maybe Avalos hears Copan that way? Is Copan saying he’s an ethical objectivist but he’s really inconsistent? When I read him it does not appear that way to me. But even if Copan is inconsistent I don’t see that he should admit he’s an ethical relativist. Inconsistency is transgression from one’s thought-out position. Probably, it happens to everyone. I know as I read some atheists I find them sounding like ethical objectivists, like the atheists Nietzsche’s madman encountered in the “village.”
Avalos, as an atheist, is committed to ethical relativism. I agree that, if atheism is true, then moral values are only subjective, and ethical relativism logically follows from this. But Avalos begs the question by saying Copan cannot admit he’s an ethical relativist precisely because Copan is a theist. This is what I think is going on here. As someone who believes the statement "God exists" is false, Avalos is thereby committed to ethical relativism. If it is false that God exists, then there are no objective moral values, even if people like Paul Copan think there are. But Copan, and I, think it is true that God exists. Therefore ethical relativism is false, and ethical objectivism is true. When Avalos, operating out of his noetic framework, calls everyone an ethical relativist, it's like a theist who tells Avalos he really believes in God even thought the atheist protests. I don't see that following that path of reasoning will get us anywhere. Because it begs the question.
Perhaps, when Avalos says all persons are really ethical relativists, he is making some kind of inside joke that I don’t get. It’s happened to me before. If that’s the case then those who get the joke are having a very good time at my expense. If it’s not a joke and Avalos is serious, then I think the joke is on him, since he seems to think that the set of "closet relativists" includes everyone from Plato to Kant to divine command theorists to even atheists who hold that there are objective moral values. If Avalos were right a lot of things would need to change in the area of philosophy of ethics. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy essay on “Moral Relativism” itself would have to be rewritten, since it assumes some philosophers (like, e.g., Martha Nussbaum) has “objectivist credentials.” I'll have to go back to a lot of my former philosophy professors and accuse them of lying as they refused to admit that they, too, were really moral relativists disguised as Kantians, Platonists, Aristotelians, etc.
Thursday, March 18, 2010
"Furious Love" Showing at Redeemer March 19
Darren Wilson's film "Furious Love" will be showing at Redeemer Fellowship Church Friday evening, March 19, 9 PM.
$5/ticket
For information call 734-242-5277.
$5/ticket
For information call 734-242-5277.
Redeemer Ministry School - Jim Hunter's Leadership Class
I would love to see many of you experience Jm Hunter's Leadership Class this spring, as I did last spring.
If you feel God wants you to attend please either respond back to me by e-mail (johnpiippo@msn.com) or let call Stella at our church office.
The class will meet: Thursdays, 5-7 PM.
If you are not a full-time RMS student and wish to take the class the cost is: $75.
If you feel God wants you to take the class but cannot afford this please contact me to make arrangements.
First class session - Thursday, March 25, 5 PM, at the church building.
If you feel God wants you to attend please either respond back to me by e-mail (johnpiippo@msn.com) or let call Stella at our church office.
The class will meet: Thursdays, 5-7 PM.
If you are not a full-time RMS student and wish to take the class the cost is: $75.
If you feel God wants you to take the class but cannot afford this please contact me to make arrangements.
First class session - Thursday, March 25, 5 PM, at the church building.
Wednesday, March 17, 2010
Come Study With Me For 9 Months!
If you'd like to have nine months of intensive academic and experiential studies focused on the Real Jesus and his Kingdom, check our our website - Redeemer Ministry School.
Study not only with me, but with Josh Bentley, Holly Benner, Jim Hunter, Gary Wilson, Jim Collins, and others.
Sept 2010 - June 2011
Study not only with me, but with Josh Bentley, Holly Benner, Jim Hunter, Gary Wilson, Jim Collins, and others.
Sept 2010 - June 2011
Monday, March 15, 2010
Bart Ehrman's Anachronistic "Jesus, Interrupted"
You can hear Bart Ehrman talk about his book Jesus, Interrupted on NPR here.
Then, you can read NT scholar Ben Witherington critique Ehrman's book here. Witherington's critique is voluminous, coming in five parts. Mostly, Ehrman's approach is seen as anachronistic, as are approaches that attempt to harmonize apparent discrepancies.
Then, you can read NT scholar Ben Witherington critique Ehrman's book here. Witherington's critique is voluminous, coming in five parts. Mostly, Ehrman's approach is seen as anachronistic, as are approaches that attempt to harmonize apparent discrepancies.
Ben Witherington On the Bible as "The Grand Narrative"
Here's a very nice article by NT scholar Ben Witherington called: "Jesus' Narrative Thought World and Message." Ben has placed a second title for this piece, which reads: "The Grand Narrative: The Storied World of Jesus and His Message." Witherington lines up with the kind of biblical work N.T. Wright is doing, the point being: read the scriptures as narrative, since that's how they were originally read. Do not read them, as Brian McLaren rightly says, "constitutionally."
Further Adventures in Neuroscience
I am no neuroscientist. But I have been long interested in brain studies and their relation to philosophy and theology. Back in the 1980s James Ashbrook was on my dissertation committee and exposed me to neuro-theological work. He was way ahead of his time.
In my last post I quoted psychologist Michael Gazzaniga as stating a claim I've heard many times now, which is:
1. The brain is the decision maker, not "I."
2. Gazzaniga's brain made a decision to communicate the idea that we think we are in charge, but we're really not.
3. Gazzaniga, therefore, is really not in charge.
4. Are we then simply to believe Gazzaniga's brain on such things?
If the brain makes a decision prior to some "self" "consciously forming a choice," can we choose against the brain? If so, then it seems that "I" am in charge, and not the brain. But if the brain really is in charge, then "I" do not have free will about this (in the sense of consciously forming a "choice." "Choice-making" then is but epiphenomenal activity, itself having no causal effect on the physical brain. "Michael Gazzaniga" did not make some "choice" between competing viewpoints and "decide" for the theory "he" is putting forth.
Certain neuroscientists such as U. of Montreal's Mario Beauregaard believe there is an "I" that makes choices that then effect changes in the physical brain. But if Gazzaniga is correct how could "we" ever know it? Why should we believe his brain? And how could one ever reason about the truth of competing theories?
In my last post I quoted psychologist Michael Gazzaniga as stating a claim I've heard many times now, which is:
- The brain acquires information and makes decisions well before we are consciously forming choices.
- We're all on a little bit of taped delay between unconsciousness and awareness.
- We think we are in charge, but we're really not.
1. The brain is the decision maker, not "I."
2. Gazzaniga's brain made a decision to communicate the idea that we think we are in charge, but we're really not.
3. Gazzaniga, therefore, is really not in charge.
4. Are we then simply to believe Gazzaniga's brain on such things?
If the brain makes a decision prior to some "self" "consciously forming a choice," can we choose against the brain? If so, then it seems that "I" am in charge, and not the brain. But if the brain really is in charge, then "I" do not have free will about this (in the sense of consciously forming a "choice." "Choice-making" then is but epiphenomenal activity, itself having no causal effect on the physical brain. "Michael Gazzaniga" did not make some "choice" between competing viewpoints and "decide" for the theory "he" is putting forth.
Certain neuroscientists such as U. of Montreal's Mario Beauregaard believe there is an "I" that makes choices that then effect changes in the physical brain. But if Gazzaniga is correct how could "we" ever know it? Why should we believe his brain? And how could one ever reason about the truth of competing theories?
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