Wednesday, September 02, 2009

P-Zombies On My Mind

I've got p-zombies on my mind! I'm just working stuff out, especially to present to my logic students. Here we go...

1. If physicalism is true, a philosophical zombie should be metaphysically impossible. (I.e., if physicalism is true, then p-zombies cannot possibly exist.
2. A philosophical zombie is conceivable.
3. Whatever is conceivable is metaphysically possible.
4. (From 2 & 3) A philosophical zombie is metaphysically possible.
5. (From 1&4, using modus ponens) Therefore, physicalism is false.

Philosophical zombie (p-zombie): a being that is, physically, exactly like I am.

If physical reality is all there is, and all phenomenal reality is nothing but physical reality, then there should be no difference between a p-zombie and myself.

But there is a difference between a p-zombie and myself, that difference being that I am conscious, sentient, and experience qualia.

Therefore such “mental” activity is logically not reducible to physical stuff; i.e., the phenomenal cannot be reduced to the physical.

Physicalism-as-atheism does not best explain this. Theism better accounts for non-physical reality then does atheism. (Physicalism logically entails atheism – see Evan Fales, e.g.)